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Seventh  Judicial District Court - Madison County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2006-0000130 Current Judge: Brent J. Moss 
Credit Bureau Of Eastern Idaho, Inc vs. Jeff D Lecheminant, etal. 
Credit Bureau Of Eastern Idaho, Inc vs. Jeff D Lecheminant, Lisa Lecheminant 
Date Code User 
NCOC ANGlE 
ANGlE 
SMlS 
SMlS 
AFSR 
AFSR 
APED 
APDJ 
ADFT 
DEFAULT 
ORDD 
DFJD 
ANGlE 
ANGlE 
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GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
ABSTRACT GWEN 
CDlS GWEN 
AACG 
OFOR 
WRlT 
WRRT 
APPL 
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APCG 
AFFD 
WRlT 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
KRlS 
KRlS 
KRlS 
KRlS 
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APPL GWEN 
AFFD GWEN 
User: GWEN e 
Judge 
New Case Filed - Other Claims Mark S. Rammell 
Filing: B1 - Civil Complaint, More Than $300, Not Mark S. Rammell 
> $1000 No Prior Appearance Paid by: Smith, 
Bryan D (attorney for Credit Bureau Of Eastern 
Idaho, Inc) Receipt number: 0103263 Dated: 
2/15/2006 Amount: $62.00 (Check) 
Summons Issued Jeff D Lecheminant Mark S. Rammell 
Summons Issued Lisa Lecheminant Mark S. Rammell 
Affidavit Of Service Jeff Lecheminant Mark S. Rammell 
Affidavit Of Service Lisa Lecheminant Mark S. Rammell 
Application For Entry Of Default Mark S. Rammell 
Application for Default Judgment Mark S. Rammell 
Affidavit In Support Of Default Mark S. Rammell 
Default Mark S. Rammell 
Order For Default And Judgment Mark S. Rammell 
Default Judgment Entered Without Hearing Mark S. Rammell 
$833.16 
Abstract of Judgment Mark S. Rammell 
Civil Disposition entered for: Lecheminant, Jeff D, Mark S. Rammell 
Defendant; Lecheminant, Lisa, Defendant; Credit 
Bureau Of Eastern Idaho, Inc, Plaintiff. 
order date: 3/28/2006 
Application and Affidavit for Writ of Continuing Mark S. Rammell 
Garnishment 
Order For Issuance of Continuing Garnishment Mark S. Rammell 
Writ Issued Mark S. Rammell 
Miscellaneous Payment: Writs Of Execution Paid Mark S. Rammell 
by: Bryan Smith Receipt number: 0104298 
Dated: 4/7/2006 Amount: $2.00 (Check) 
Writ Returned Mark S. Rammell 
Application for Order of Examination Mark S. Rammell 
Order of Examination (Bonneville County) Mark S. Rammell 
Order of Examination (Bonneville County) Mark S. Rammell 
Application For Continuing Garnishment Mark S. Rammell 
Affidavit of Bryan D Smith in Support of Mark S. Rammell 
Application For Order of Continuing Garnishment 
Writ Issued Mark S. Rammell 
Miscellaneous Payment: Writs Of Execution Paid Mark S. Rammell 
by: Bryan Smith Receipt number: 0108131 
Dated: 10/2/2006 Amount: $2.00 (Check) 
Application for Order of Continuing Garnishment Mark S. Rammell 
Affidavit of Bryan D Smith in Support of Writ of Mark S. Rammell 
Execution 
Date: 
Time: 0 
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Seventh Judicial District Court - Madison County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2006-0000130 Current Judge: Brent J. Moss 
Credit Bureau Of Eastern Idaho, Inc vs. Jeff D Lecheminant, etal. 
Credit Bureau Of Eastern Idaho, Inc vs. Jeff D Lecheminant, Lisa Lecheminant 
Date Code 
ORDR 
WRlT 
AFFD 
WRlT 
MOTN 
BREF 
NOTH 
ORDR 
HRSC 
MlSC 
MEMO 
MEMO 
HRHD 
ORDR 
WRRT 
ORDR 
APDC 
ORDR 
STlP 
ORDR 
BREF 
RREF 
BREF 
User 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
KRlS 
GWEN 
KRlS 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
L 
KRlS 
User: GWEN e 
Judge 
Order for Garnishment (recieved) Mark S. Rammell 
Writ Issued Mark S. Rammell 
Miscellaneous Payment: Writs Of Execution Paid Mark S. Rammell 
by: Bryan Smith Receipt number: 0000366 
Dated: 1/18/2007 Amount: $2.00 (Check) 
Affidavit in Support of writ of Execution Mark S. Rammell 
Writ Issued Mark S. Rammell 
Miscellaneous Payment: Writs Of Execution Paid Mark S. Rammell 
by: Bryan Smith Receipt number: 0005428 
Dated: 9/21/2007 Amount: $2.00 (Check) 
Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption Mark S. Rammell 
Brief in Support of Motion to Contest Claim of Mark S. Rammell 
Exemption 
Notice Of Hearing Mark S. Rammell 
Order (received) Not signed Mark S. Rammell 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Claim of Mark S. Rammell 
Exemption 10/23/2007 11 :30 AM) 
Request to Appear telephonically Mark S. Rammell 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Contet Mark S. Rammell 
Claim of Exemption 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Contest Mark S. Rammell 
Claim of Exemption 
Hearing result for Motion for Claim of Exemption Mark S. Rammell 
held on 1012312007 11 :30 AM: Hearing Held Writ 
Recinded 
Order Granting Request to Appear Mark S. Rammell 
Telephonically 
Writ Returned Mark S. Rammell 
Order Mark S. Rammell 
Appeal Filed In District Court Mark S. Rammell 
Filing: RIC - Appeals And Transfers Magistrate Brent J. Moss 
To District Other Cvlsp Appeals Paid by: Smith, 
Bryan D (attorney for Credit Bureau Of Eastern 
Idaho, Inc) Receipt number: 0008372 Dated: 
2/28/2008 Amount: $53.00 (Check) For: Credit 
Bureau Of Eastern Idaho, Inc (plaintiff) 
Order Governing Procedure on Appeal Brent J. Moss 
Stipulation Governing Porcedure on Appeal Brent J. Moss 
Order Brent J. Moss 
Plaintiff's Brief on Appeal Brent J. Moss 
Respondent's Brief on Appeal Brent J. Moss 
Plaintiff's Reply Brief on Appeal Brent J. Moss 
ROA 
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Seventh Judicial District Court - Madison County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2006-0000130 Current Judge: Brent J. Moss 
Credit Bureau Of Eastern Idaho, Inc vs. Jeff D Lecheminant, etal. 
Credit Bureau Of Eastern Idaho, Inc vs. Jeff D Lecheminant, Lisa Lecheminant 
Date Code User 
HRSC 
NOTH 
MOTN 
AFFD 
ORDR 
NOTH 
HRSC 
MINE 
DCHH 
MEMO 
CDlS 
STAT 
ANGlE 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
KRlS 
KRlS 
ANGlE 
ANGlE 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
GWEN 
User: GWEN 
Judge 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 1012012008 10:OO Brent J. Moss 
AM) 
Notice Of Hearing Brent J. Moss 
Motion to Reschedule hearing Brent J. Moss 
Affidavit of Marvin M Smith Brent J. Moss 
Order on Motion to Reschedule Hearing Brent J. Moss 
(received) 
Amended Notice Of Hearing Brent J. Moss 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 12/08/2008 10:OO Brent J. Moss 
AM) Notice of Appeal 
Minute Entry Hearing type: Hearing Hearing date: Brent J. Moss 
12/8/2008 Time: 10:33 am Court reporter: David 
Marlow 
Hearing result for Hearing held on 12/08/2008 Brent J. Moss 
10:OO AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: David Marlow 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 pages 
Memorandum Decision Brent J. Moss 
Civil Disposition entered for: Lecheminant, Jeff D, Brent J. Moss 
Defendant; Lecheminant, Lisa, Defendant; Credit 
Bureau Of Eastern Idaho, Inc, Plaintiff. Filing 
date: 211 1/2009 
STATUS CHANGED: closed Brent J. Moss 
Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court Brent J. Moss 
($86.00 for the Supreme Court to be receipted via 
Misc. Payments. The $15.00 County District 
Court fee to be inserted here.) Paid by: Smith, 
Bryan D (attorney for Credit Bureau Of Eastern 
Idaho, Inc) Receipt number: 0016672 Dated: 
4/7/2009 Amount: $15.00 (Check) For: Credit 
Bureau Of Eastern Idaho, Inc (plaintiff) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Supreme Court Appeal Brent J. Moss 
Fee (Please insert case #) Paid by: Bryan Smith 
Receipt number: 0016673 Dated: 4/7/2009 
Amount: $86.00 (Check) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copies Of Brent J. Moss 
Transcripts For Appeal Per Page Paid by: Bryan 
Smith Receipt number: 0016674 Dated: 4/7/2009 
Amount: $200.00 (Check) 
- A  I 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
Idaho StnteBar # 441 1 
McGRATH, MEACHAM Sr SMITI-I, PLLC 
4 14 Shoup Avenue 
P.O. Box 5073 1 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
(208) 524-073 1 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DIS'IKIC'T COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF MADISON 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
CREDIT BUREAU OF EASTERN IDAHO 
INC, an Idaho corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
JEFF D. LECHEMINANT and LISA 
LECHEMIANT, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. C\1 r C ) C ~ - -  130 
COMPLAINT 
Fee Category: B. 1 
Fee: $62.00 
COMES NOW plaintiff, Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho, Inc, and for a claim against 
defendants. alleges as follows: 
1. The plaintiff is an Idaho corporation qualified to do business in the State of Idaho. 
2. The defendant, Jeff D. Lecheminant, is an individual residing in the State of Idaho. 
3. The defendant, Lisa Lecheminant, is an individual residing in the State of Idaho. 
4. At all times mentioned herein the plaintiff was, and still is, a licensed and bonded 
collector under the laws of the State of Idaho, and before the commencement of this action the 
debts herein sued upon was assigned by City of Rexburg to the plaintiff for the purpose of 
--€mwLA*IT 
PAGE 7 
collection. The plaintill is now the holder thereof for such purposes. The defendants are 
husband and wife who inc~rrred the debts as allegcd herein for community purposes. 
5. The dcfendants are indebted to the plaintiff by reason of the allegations herein and 
owe the plaintiff in the followillg stated amounts: 
CREDIT BUREUA OF EASTERN IDAHO 
Principal Ainount Owing $ 63.66 
Prejudgment Interest $ 20.62 
Subtotal $ 84.28 
RAYS INCORPORATED 
Principal Amount Owing $195.99 
Prejudgment Interest $1 10.89 
Subtotal $306.88 
TOTAL $391.16 
6. The plaintiff is entitled to f~lrther prejudgment interest from the date the complaint is 
filed until judgillent is entered. 
7. Despite the plaintiffs requests and demands, and without offering any reason or 
objection to the bill, the defendants have failed to pay the indebtedness in full. 
8. To obtain payment of the obligation due, the plaintiff has been required to retain the 
services of McGrath, Meacham & Smith, PLLC, attorneys at law. This action arises from an 
open account andlor from services provided. Moreover, written demand for payment on the 
defendants has been made more than 10 days prior to commencing this action. Pursuant to Idaho 
Code 9 12- 120(1) and 12- 120(3) the plaintiff is entitled to recover the plaintiffs attorney's fees 
incurred herein in the sum of $350.00 if judgment is taken by default and such greater amount as 
may be evidenced to the court if this claim is contested. Pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure $ 54(d)(l) the plaintiff is further entitled to recover the plaintiffs costs incurred 
herein. 
COMPLAINT 
PAGE 8 
WIIGREFORE, the plaintiff demands judgmeilt against the defendants, and each of them, 
for thc principal sun1 of $259.65, together with legal interest on said sum in thc amount of 
$1 3 1.5 1, the filing fee of $62 and attorney's fees incurred herein in the sum of $350.00, for a 
coinbilled total of $ $803.16 plus the costs of suit to be proven to the court, and for such other 
and further relief as is equitable and just. 
w 
DATED: 13 February, 2006. 
McGRATp, MEACHAM & SMITH, PLLC 
COMPIAINT 
PAGE 9 
NOTICE UNDER 
FEDERAL FAIR DEBT COLLECTION l'lIACTICI1:S ACT 
15 U.S.C. @1692a to 16920 
Jeff D. and Lisa Lechcminant 
259 J Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
1 .  Amount of Debt: $391.16 
2. Name of Creditor: Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho, Inc 
3. Unless you disputc the validity of the above-described debt, or a portion thereof, within 30 
days of your receipt of this letter, we will assume that the debt is valid. 
4. If you notify us, in writing, within 30 days of your receipt of this letter that you dispute the 
debt, or a portion thereof, we will obtain verification of the debt, or a copy of any judgment, 
and will mail you a copy of the verification or judgment. 
5. If you request, in writing, within 30 days of your receipt of this letter, we will provide you 
with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor 
described above. 
6. This Noticc informs you of specific rights to information under federal law. The time limits 
set in the accompanying demand letter must be conlplied with or legal action to collect the 
debt may be commenced. Any judgment in such legal action cannot be taken by default until 
20 days after you have been served a summons and a copy of the complaint. Thus, no 
judgment will be taken within 30 days of this Notice, but the 30 days allowed by this Notice 
are not in addition to the requirements of state law. 
NOTE: This is an attempt to collect a debt. Any information obtained will be used for that 
purpose. 
COMPLAINT 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
ISB # 441 1 
McGMTH, MEACHAM, 
& SMITH, PLLC 
4 1 4 Shoup Avenue 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
(208) 524-073 1 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
The defendants, Jeff D. and Lisa Lecheminant, having been regularly served with process 
and having failed to appear and plead to plaintiffs complaint on file herein, and the time allowed 
by law for so pleading having expired and the default of said defendants having been duly 
entered, and it appearing that said defendants is not an infant or inconlpetent person and an 
affidavit of non-military service having been filed herein, and it appearing by the Application for 
Entry of Default Judgment, Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith, Attorney for plaintiff, and the court's 
records and files, that plaintiff is entitled to a judgment herein; 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
PAGE 1 1 
CREDIT BUFGAU OF EASTERN IDAHO, 
INC, an Idaho corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
JEFF D. LECFIEMINANT and LISA 
LECHEMIANT, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-06- 130 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
IT IS HI<RL:UY OIIDEKUI), Al>JIIIIGElI AND LIECREED that plaintiff has and 
recovers from the dekndants the sum of $833.16, said amount being itemized as follows, to-wit: 
Principal $259.65 
Interest $131.51 
Attorney's fee $350.00 
Filing fee $ 62.00 
Service fee $ 30.00 
Amount Paid $ -0.00 
TOTAL $833.16 
upon which sum interest shall accrue at the rate provided by law, and upon which judgment 
execution may issue. 
DATED this 3 day of March, 2006. 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
PAGE 12 
I hcreby ccrtify that I am the clerk of thc abovc-entitled court, and that on the day 
of March, 2006, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFAULT JUDGMENT on 
the persons listed below by mailing, with the correct postage thereon, or by causing the same to 
be hand delivered. 
Persons Served: 
Bryan D. Smith 
McGrath, Meacham &, Smith, PLLC 
4 14 Shoup Avenue 
P.O. Box 5073 1 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Jeff D. and Lisa Lecheminant 
259 J Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
( ) Hand m a i l  
/ 
Clerk 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
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Icluho Stale Bar Nzi~nher 441 I 
McGRATH, MEAHCAM & SMITH, PLLC 
4 14 Shoup Avenue 
P.O. Box 5073 1 
MADISON COUNTY --
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telcphonc: (208) 524-073 1 
Facsimile: (208) 529-41 66 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
MAGISTRATE COURT 
CREDIT BUREAU OF EASTERN 
IDAHO, INC., an Idaho corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
JEFF D. LECHEMINANT and LISA 
LECHEMIANT, 
Case No.: CV-06-130 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN D. SMITH 
IN SUPOPRT OF APPLICATION 
FOR ORDER OF CONTINUING 
GARNISHMENT 
Defendants. I 
I 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
Bryan D. Smith, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I represent the plaintiff in this case, Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho, Inc., 
and as such I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein. 
2. Judgment was entered herein on March 28, 2006 in the sum of $833.16. 
3. The cause of action arose after July 1, 1987, and therefore, the judgment 
bears interest at the rate of which is in effect on the date of entry of the judgment. (The 
rate changes July 1 of each year as provided by Idaho Code $ 28-21 - 104 for all judgrneilt 
---A-*mmT 01: 
APPLICATION FOR ORDER OF CONTINUING 
GARNISHMENT 
PAGE 14 
declared dilring tlie succeeding 12 months.) The applicable rate for the judginent in this 
matter is 8.375% per annum. 
4. The dcfcndant is Jeff D. Lcchcminant. 
5. Sandy Moulton and Jeff D. Lechenlinant are husband and wife. 
6. Sandy Moulton and Jeff D. Lecheminant reside at the following address: 
Sandy Moulton and Jeff D. Lecheminant 
259 J Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
7. Sandy Moulton is an einployee of Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center. 
8. Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center is located at the following address: 
Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Ccntcr 
3 100 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
9. Sandy Moulton's "earnings" from Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center 
are comlnunity property. See Idaho Code Section 32-906. 
10. The word ' earnin include "compensation paid or payable for personal t9' 
services, whether denonlinated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise." See 
Idaho Code Section 1 1-206. 
1 1. Again, Sandy Moulton and Jeff D. Lechenlinant arc husband and wife; 
therefore, they have "obligations of mutual respect, fidelity, and support" for each other. 
- I 
See Idaho Code Section 32-901. 
-
12. In addition, the carnings of Sandy Moulton are "moneys" or "other 
property" and Jeff D. Lecheminant has an interest in such earnings. See Idaho Code 
Section 1 1-20 1. 
13. The foregoing interest is "liable to execution". See Idaho Code Section 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN D. SMITI-I JN SUPPORT OF 
APPLICATION FOR ORDER Oh' CUNTTNUIBti 
GARNISHMENT 
PAGE 15 
14. Thus, Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho, Inc., respectfully requcsts the 
issuance of an ORDER OF CONTINUING GARNISHMENT against the employer of 
Sandy Moulton, Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center. See ~enerallv Idaho Code 
Section 8-509(b). 
. , 
e- 
DATED this 7/1P day of September, 2006. 
McGMTH, MEACHAM & SMITH, PLLC 
-- 
__""-i - 
/,<%-*' /< 'J -. f /~" 2---- -, 
>>W-L ,*u>-"+y3~-Y~:'~--- <+-<2=."/' 
By: -2f~ -- - -. - -" -- > - -.--< -- 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before rile this @ ? l a y  of September, 
2006. 
My Commission ~x~ires://?//z/ 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN D. SMITH IN SUPPORT OF 
APPLICATION FOR V G  
GARNISHMENT 
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Bryan 1). Smith, Esq. 
I&!70 Slnle Bar Nzunbcr. 4411 
McGKATH, MEAHCAM & SMITH, PLLC 
4 14 Shoup Avenue 
P.O. ~ 0 x 5 0 7 3  1 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
'Telephone: (208) 524-073 1 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4 166 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN '1'1-IE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY 01; MADISON 
MAGISTRATE COURT 
CREDIT BUREAU OF EASTERN 
IDAHO, INC., an Idaho corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
JEFF D. LECHEMINANI' and LISA 
LECHEMIANT, 
Defendants. 
Case No: CV-06-130 
ORDER FOR CONTINUING 
GARNISHMENT 
The Plaintiff filed a11 application on September 26, 2006, entitled 
"APPLICATION FOR ORDER OF CONTINUDJG GARNISHMENT." The application 
requests the issuance of an order of continuing garnishment against the employer of 
Sandy Moulton. 
Based on the foregoing application, the court hereby grants the application and 
enters the following ORDER: 
1. Thc Sheriff of Bonneville, Idaho shall garnish the maximum amount of 
Sandy Moulton's disposable earnings from Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center at 
each disbursement interval until the JUDGMENT, plus interest, is paid in f~lll.  
-'KUHTFUR CONTINIJING GARNISHMENT 
(RESCINDED) 
PAGE 17 
2. Eastern Idaho Rcgional Mcdical Ccntcr is locatcd at thc following addrcss: 
Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center 
3 100 Channing Way 
a, Idaho Falls, ID 83404 1 / 3. This garnishn ~ n t  shall operate continufisly until the JUDGMENT, plus 
tcrcst, 
I 
O R ~ E R  FOR CONTINUING GARNISHMENT 
(RESCINDED) 
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Bryan 11. Smith, Esq. 
ISB $1 441 1 
McGRATH, MEACHAM & SMITH, PLIX 
414 Shoup Avenue 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
(208) 524-073 1 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COUIiT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
JEFF D. LECHEMINANT and LISA 
LECHEMIANT, 
CREDIT BUREAU 01: EASTERN IDAHO, 
INC., an Idaho corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
Defendants. I 
Case No. CV-06- 130 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF WRIT OF 
EXECUTION 
STATE OF IDAHO 
County of Bonneville 
Bryan D. Smith, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I have personal laowledge of the facts stated herein as attorney for the plaintiff in the 
above-entitled action. 
2. Judgment was entered herein on March 28,2006 in the sum of $833.16. The cause 01 
action arose after July 1, 1987, and therefore, the judgment thereon bears interest at the rate 
which is in effect on the date of entry of the judgment. (The rate changes July 1 of each year as 
provided by Idaho Code 5 28-21 -104 for all judgments declared during the succeeding 12 
mnnths  > 'The aDDlicable rate for the judglnent in this matter is 8.375% per annum. 
4FFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF WRIT OF 
3XECUTION 
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3. Therefore, the court should issue the writ in the amount of $972.20 broken down as 
Unpaid Judgment 
Accrued Interest 
Recording Fee 
Execution Fee(s) 
Service Fee 
Payments 
TOTAL 
4. The fees listed above were actually and necessarily incurred in the post-judgment 
collectioll of the judgment. 
@ DATED: \ Scpternber, 2007 
McGRATH, MEACHAM & SMITH, PLLC 
SUBSCRIBED 
(SI;AL) 
Bryan D. Smith 
AND SWORN to before me on September, 2007. 
-. . 
.. " 
Ok 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
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McGRATH, MEACHAM & SMITH, PLLC 
4 14 Shoup Avenue 
P.O. Box 5073 1 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
(208) 524-073 1 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRIC'T COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
CREDIT BUREAU OF EASTERN 
IDAHO, INC., an Idaho corporation 
Plaintiff, 
JEFF D. LECHEMINANT and LISA 
LECHEMINANT, 
Case No. CV-06-130 
MOTION TO CONTEST 
CLAIM OF EXEMPTION 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW plaintiff, Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho, Inc., by and through its 
counsel of record, Bryan D. Smith, Esq., of the firm of McGrath, Meacham & Smith, 
PLLC, pursuant to Idaho Code 5 11-203 and moves the Court for an order denying the 
third pai-ty's claim of exemption. 
This motion is made on the grounds and for the reasons that the third party has 
filed a Claim of Exemption, a copy of which is attached hereto marked as Exhibit "A" 
and by this reference included herein. The Claim of Exemption provides no legal basis to 
exempt the monies garnished in this proceeding. 
- 
MWTIVN 1.0 CCNI'EST CLAIM OF EXEMPTION 
PAGE 2 1 
'I'his nlotion is based on thc Noticc of Hearing, Brief in Support of Motion to 
Contest Claim of Exemption, and this Motion to Contest Clailn of Exeinptioi~ and 011 the 
Court's records and files. 
Plaintiff requests oral argument on said motion. 
DATED this \\up day of October, 2007. 
McGRATH, MEACHAM & SMITH, PLLC / 
By: 
, ,.' Attorneys for Plaintiff 
~f 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 I-IERERY CERTIFY that on the \@ day of October, 2007.1 caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO CONTEST CLAIM OF 
EXEMPTION to be served, by placing the same in a scalcd envelope and depositing it in 
the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or by causing the same to be delivered by hand, 
facsimile or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ v i l e  Transnlission 
[ and Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ le Transmission 
[ I-land Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
Marvin M. Sinith 
Anderson Nelson Hall Smith, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Bonneville County Sheriff 
Civil Division 
605 North Capital Ave 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
7VlDTlUN '1'0 CON'I'EST CLAIM OF EXEMPTION 
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.@- 15-2007 MON 04:15 PM P"cO CIVIL DIVISION FAX NO, "1,85291483 > 
MARVIN M. SMITH 
ISB NO. 2236 
ANDERSON NELSON HALL SMITII, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
Post Office Box 5 1630 
Idaho Falls, Jdaho 83405-1 630 
Telephone (208) 522-3001 
Fax (208) 523-7254 
Attorneys for Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center 
IN TI-IE DISTRICT COURT OF TITE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF 'I'HE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TI-TI3 COUNTY OF MADISON 
I 
CREDIT BUREAU OF EASTERN IDAHO, ; Case No. CV-06-130 
INC., an Idaho corporation, I 
I CLAIM OF EXEMPTION 
Plaintiff, I 
I 
JEFF D. LECHEMINANT and LISA I I 
LECHEMINANT, I 
I 
Defendant. I 
Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center and Sandy Moulton claim an exemption 
from levy for the following described money: 
a. Money, which will be paid to Sandy Moulton as: 
J Wages (This exemption is being claimed pursuant to Idaho Code 5 11- 
- 
MOTION TO CONTEST rr PN 
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15-2007 MON 04:15 PM P'V CIVIL DIVISION 
i 
! 
FAX NO, "1,85291483 
j: 
4.4 DATED this b5 day of Octobcr, 2007. 
ANDERSON NELSON PULL SMITH, P.A. 
4&yz*(#&g$j$/ 
MARVIN M. SMITH, attorney for Eastern Idaho 
Regiol~sll Medical Center 
DATED this 1 h day of October, 2007 f7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifi that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this /,Ydday of October, 2007, by hand delivery, mailing with the necessary postage affixed 
thereto, facsimile, or overnight mail. 
Boilneville Couilty Sherifl's Office 
605 N. Capital 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Via I-land Delivery 
Madison Couilty SherifPs Office 
145 1.:. Main Street 
Rcxburg, ID 83440 
Via Facsimile - 3 56-7640 
MARVIN M. SMITH 
- ~ ~ ~ F ~ K ~ ? = - T ~ - ~ C \ % T ~ M  OF EXE PTION 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
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MCGRATH, MEACHAM & SMITH, PLLC 
4 14 S h o ~ ~ p  Avenue 
P.O. Box 5073 1 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
(208) 524-073 1 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STAlE 01: IDAI-10, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
JEFF D. LECHEMINANT and LISA 
LECHEMIANT, husband and wife 
CREDIT BUREAU OF EASTERN IDAHO, 
INC., AN IDAI-I0 CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
Defendants 
Case No. CV-06-130 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
CONTEST CLAIM OF EXEMPTION 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
This matter coilles before the court on a motion to contest a claim of exemption. 
The factual history is set foi-th below. 
11. FACTUAL HISTORY. 
DATE EVENT 
March 28, 2006 The coui-t enters judgment against Jeff Lecheminant and 
Lisa Lecheminant in the amount of $833.16; 
September 5,2006 Counsel for plaintiff met with Jeff Lecheminant who said 
(1) he was self employed as a contractor; a l~d  (2) he was 
married to Sandy Moulton who was working at Eastern 
Idaho Regional Medical Center (EIRMC) as a nurse; 
1EF IN SUPPOR1' OF MOTION TO CONTEST 
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September 26, 2006 Plaintiff files an Application for on Order for Continuing 
Garnishment, Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith. in Support of 
IZxecution, Order For Continuing Garnishment, and Writ of 
Execution; the continuing garnishment seeks to garnish 
Sandy Moulton's community property wages at EIRMC; 
Septeinbcr 28, 2007 The Court enters the Order for Coiltinuing Garnishnlent; 
December 2006 the Bonneville County Sheriff refuses to serve Order for 
Continuing Garnishment saying that plaintiff could not 
garnish Sandy Moulton's wages at EIRMC; 
January 2007 The court clerk tells plaintiffs paralegal that " p e r k d ~ e  
~ a m m e l ~ ~ o u l t o n ' s  wages"; the 
c%ZEIerk stateahat under Miller v. Miller, 113 Idaho 41 5 
(1987) a writ for continuous garnishment cannot be issued 
against a defendant's spouse; 
January 15, 2007 Plaintiff files Application for Order for Garnishment, 
Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith in Support of Execution, Order 
for Garnishment, and Writ of Execution; 
March 8, 2007 The court clerk tells staff for plaintiffs counsel that coui-t 
z g l l  the writ and that the court is returning the writ; 7 
Septeillber 25,2007 Plaintiff sends garnishment to EIRMC to garnish the wages 
of Sandy Moulton who is married to Jeff Lecheminant (the 
~ o ~ 1 ~ ~  Sheriff serves the garnishment this 
time); 
October 15,2007 Attorneys for Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center file a 
claim of exemption; 
October 17, 2007 Plaintiff files its motion to contest claim of exemption; and 
October 23, 2007 Hearing set on Plaintiffs Motion to Contest Claim of 
Exemption. 
I 3 R i E L I W C T P I T M T  
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111. IDAHO CASE LAW HOLDS THAT COMMUNITY lJRO1'ER1'Y CAN 
SATISFY TI1E SEPARATE DEBT OF ONE OF TI-1E SPOUSES. 
A. Idaho Case Law. 
Idaho law first addressed in Holt v. Empey, 32 Idaho 106 (1 9 19) the extent to 
which cominunity property can be liable for the separate debt of a spouse. In Hull, the 
real property of Empey's husband was attached by I-Iolt to satisfy a debt that the husband 
had incurred as a surety for a third party. Einpey intervened in the action, alleging that 
the property attached was coininunity property and not subject to levy for the separate 
debt of her husband. The Idaho Supremc Court disagreed stating, "We therefore hold that 
community real estate is liable to attachment and execution for the debts of the husband, 
whether incurred for his own use or for the benefit of the community." Holt v. Empey, 
szqra, 32 Idaho 110. Although it is unclear from the court's opinion whether the 
husband's debt was incurred before or during the marriage, the coininunity property was 
liable regardless of whether the debt was antenuptial or postnuptial. See JOANN 
HENDERSON, IDAHO LAW FOUNDTION, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW OF 
IDAHO ch. 9, at 15 (1982). 
In G~lslin v. Byarn, 4 1 Idaho 538 (1 925), Gustin and her husband lived on land 
owned by Gustin's father under an arrangement whereby the husband was to farm the 
land during the year and give one-half of the crops to the father for use of the land. 
During the marriage, the husband gave a note to his brother secured by a chattel mortgage 
covering the whole of the crops, including the share of Gustin's father. At the father's 
insistence, the mortgage was subsequently released by the brother. At around the same 
time, the brother endorsed the note to a hardware company, which then brought suit to 
collect on the note. A default judgnlent was obtained, and the husband's share of the 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONTEST 
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crops was levicd upon and sold in order to satisfy the judgment. Gustin filed an action 
seeking to set aside the judgment and to recover the value of the crops, claiming that the 
crops were comnlunity property and exempt from execution. 
On appeal from a judgment entered in favor of the defendants, the Idaho Supreme 
Court noted that at that time, I.C. 5 32-912 gave the husband the managenlent and control 
of the community property, with full power of alienation except as provided in the 
statute. Among the powers the husband could exercise alone was the sale of community 
personal propcrty, whether it was exempt from execution or not. Relying on the holding 
in Holt, the Court held that the comnlunity property was liable for the separate debts of 
the husband as well as for community debts. The Court said, "[tlhe community propcrty 
is liable for the separate debts of the husband as well as for community debts." Gustin v. 
Byam, supra, 41 Idaho 538 at 603. Consequently, Gustin was unable to recover the 
property sold. 
Both Ilolt and Gustin were decided at a time when the husband was given sole 
power to manage and control the community property by s ta t~~te .  In 1974, the legislature 
amended I.C. 5 32-912, giving the husband and the wife equal management and control 
of the community property. See 1974 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 194, 3 2. Despite the change 
in the management and control of the community property and in spite of any doubt 
concerning the continued vitality of Holt and Gzrstin, those cases were cited with 
approval by our Supreme Court in Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170 (1995), where the court 
cited Holt, Gtutin, and Crapo, Equal Managenzenl of Conznzunity Property: Creditors' 
Rights, 13 Idaho L. Rev. 177, 178 (1 977), for the proposition that 'yp]arties often marry 
CLAIM OF EXEMPTION 
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with separate anteniiptial debts, and tltose debts are payable from colnlniilzity 
property." Id. at 173 (emphasis added.) 
More recently, in Action Collection Service, Inc. v. Seele, 138 Idaho 753 (Ct. App. 
2003), the Court of Appeals held that the separate property debt of one spouse can bc 
satisfied out of the community property wages of that spouse. The court reasoned that 
the elevation of the status of wives to equal nlanagers of the cominunity property by 
vii-tue of the amendnlent to Idaho statutes, without a specific exemption of the liability of 
the community property for each spouse's separate debts, suggests that the legislature 
intended for the rules of law enunciated in Holt and Gustin to apply equally to the 
husband and the wife after aillendnlent of the statute. Therefore, just as the community 
property in those cases was liable for the separate debts of one spouse, whether 
antenuptial or postnuptial, the community property wages were liable to satisfy the 
separate property judginent of one spouse. 
Therefore, just as the community property in Holt, Gzutin, and most recently 
Action Collection was liable for the separate debts of one spouse, the community property 
wages of the defendant's spouse are liable to satisfy the plaintiffs judginent against 
defendant. As stated in Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho at 173: "Parties often marry with 
separate anteniipticcl debts, aizrl those clebts are payable froin comnziinity property." Id. 
at 173 (emphasis added.) 
B. Idaho Statutory Law. 
Under Idaho Code Section 32-912, "[elither the husband or the wife shall have the 
right to manage and control the community property." Here, there can be no dispute that 
the wages of defendant's spouse are the comm~ulity property of defendant. See Martsch 
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v. Murtsch, 103 Idaho 142 (1982) (holding that wages are coinmunity propcrty). This 
means that the judgment defendant has the right to manage and control 100% of his 
spouse's wages. 
Moreover, Idaho Code Section 1 1-20 1 identifies the property in Idaho that is 
subject to execution as follows: 
Property liable to seizure.-All goods, chattels, moneys and otlier 
property, both real and personal, or any irzterest tlzereitz of the judgnzent debtor, 
not exempt by law, and allproperty and rigltts ofproperty, seized and held under 
attachment in the action, are liable to execution. Shares and interest in any 
corporation or company, and debts and credits, and all otlzerproperty botlz real 
a~zdpersotzal, or any interest in either real or personal property, and all other 
property not capable of manual delivery, may be attached on execution in like 
manner as upon writs of attaclment. (Emphasis added.) 
The phrases "otlierproperty, both real atzdpersonal, or any irzterest therein of tlze 
judgmetzt debtor, not exempt by law, and all property and rights of property" and "all 
other property botlz real antlpersonal, or tcny interest in either real or personal 
property" are broad enough to include "community property" generally defined as "all 
property acquired during marriage." Idaho Code Section 32-906. 
All thcse statutory provisions are further supportive of Idaho case law that a 
judgment creditor can satisfy a judgment against a judgment debtor from the community 
property wages of the judgment debtor's spouse. 
C. The Wages Of The Defendant's Spouse Are Conlin~nity Property Subject 
To Execution. 
Here, the plaintiff has a judgment against Jeff Lecheininant. Jeff is married to 
Sandy Moulton who receives wages from her employment at Eastern Idaho Regional 
Medical Center. Sandy's wages are community property. Under Idaho case law, these 
wages are liable to satisfy Jeff s separate property judgment. Under Idaho stat~~tory law, 
~ ~ ~ P O R ~ ~ ~ - ' M ~ ~  
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Jeff has the right to manage and control 100% of Sandy's wages therefore making 
Sandy's wages subject to execution and garnishment. 
IV. ALTHOUGH THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY WAGES OF SANDY 
MOULTON ARE NOT SUBJECT TO AN ORDER FOR CONTINUING 
GARNISHMENT, THEY ARE. SUBJECT TO GARNISHMENT. 
Idaho case law established in Holt, Gustin, Bliss, and Aclion Collection all stands 
for the proposition that the community property wages of the defendant's spouse are 
liable to satisfy the plaintiffs judgment against defendant. The issue is by what method a 
plaintiff can attach those community property wages. Plaintiff submits that Idaho law 
prohibits such attachment by way of an order for continuing garnishment. See Miller v. 
Miller, supra, 113 Idaho at 415. However, Idaho law allows such attachment by way of 
garnishment. 
A. The Community Property Wages Of A Defendant Spouse Are Not Subject 
To Attachment By An Order Of Continuous Garnishment. 
In Miller v. Miller, supra, 11 3 Idaho at 41 5, the court addressed whether a 
judgment only against a husband could be enforced by way of an order for continuous 
garnislment against the wages of the judgment defendant's wife. The court did not 
address the issue of whether the wages of a judgment debtor's spouse are or are not 
subject to "levy," "execution," or "garnishment." Specifically, the husband had been 
sued for trespass and a judgnlent was entered against him. The plaintiff obtained an order 
of corztirluous garnishment against the wages of the judgment defendant's wife. The 
judgment defendant's wife was not a party to the underlying lawsuit. The issue arose 
whether the order of continiroiis garnishment could be issued against the wages of the 
judgment defendant's wife given that she was not on the judgment. 
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The court held that "joinder of a spouse as a party defendant was a necessary 
prerequisite, under I.C. Section 8-509(b)." Id. at 420. Idaho Code Section 8-509(b), 
which deals with an order for continuous garnishment, reads as follows: 
(b) When the garnishee is the employer of the judgineilt debtor, the 
judgment creditor, upon application to the court, shall have issued by the clerk of 
court, a continuing garnislmlent directing the employer-garnishee to pay to the 
sheriff such future moneys coming due to the judginent debtor as may come due 
to said judgment debtor as a result of the judgment debtor's employment. This 
continuing garnishment shall continue in force and effect until the judgment is 
satisfied. The creditor shall be solely responsible for insuring that the amounts 
garnished do not exceed the amount due on the judgment. 
The court reasoned that "[tlhe language of I.C. Section 8-509 is specifically limited to a 
'judgment creditor' and a 'judgment debtor.' 'A well-settled rule of construction is that 
the words of a statute must be given their plain, usual and ordinary meaning in the 
absence of any ambiguity.' A judgment debtor according to Black's Law Diclionary (5th 
ed. 1979), p. 758 is, 'A person against whom judgment has been recovered, and which 
remains unsatisfied.' Paula, having not been a named pai-ty defendant, clearly did not 
qualify as a judginent debtor and, hence, was not within the scope of I.C. Section 8- 
509(b)." Miller v. Miller, supm, 13 Idaho at 420. 
In other words, the plaintiff in Miller could not get an order of contintlolls 
garnishment because the wife's employer (the garnishee) was not the employer of the 
judgment debtor (the husband debtorldefendant). Miller stands for the proposition that a 
plaintiff cannot get an order of continuoiis garnislunent against the wages of a spouse 
because of the limitations contained in I.C. Section 8-509. Miller does not even address 
the issue whether a plaintiff can execute by garnishment the wages of the defendant's 
spouse. 
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B. The Con~inunity Property Wages Of A Defendant Spouse Are Subiect To 
Execution By Garnishment. 
Idaho Code Section 8-507, states, in pertinent part, that upon written directions 
from the plaintiff or his attorney, the sheriff shall execute and garnish "property 
belonging to the defendant": 
8-507. Garnishment - Service of writ of attachment, execution, or 
garnishment - Banks.-(a) Upon receiving written directions from the plaintiff 
or his attorney, that any person or corporation , public or private, has in his or its 
possession or control, any credits or other personal property belonging to the 
defendant, or is owing any debt to the defendant, the sheriff shall serve upon any 
such person, or corporation identified in the plaintiffs written directions all of the 
following documents: 
(1) a copy of the writ; 
(2) a notice that such credits, or other property, or debts, as the case 
may be, are attached in pursuance of such writ; 
(3) a notice of exemptions available under federal and state law; 
(4) instructions to debtors and third parties for asserting a claim of 
exemption; 
(5) a form for malting a claim of exemption; and 
(6) if the garnishee is a bank or depository institution, a search fee of 
five dollars ($5.00) and the last known mailing address of the 
defendant and, if known, a tax identification number, that will 
enable the garnishee to identify the defendant on its records. 
Here, Jeff has the right to manage and control 100% of Sandy's wages at EIRMC. 
For this reason, and all the other reasons that cited in this brief, Sandy's wages constitute 
"property belonging to him." Accordingly, Sandy's wages are subject to execution and 
garnishment by virtue of Idaho Code Section 8-507(a). 
V. THE EXEMPTION THAT EASTERN IDAI-I0 REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER RELIES UPON IS NOT ENFORCEABLE BECAUSE IT IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
A statute that denies equal protection of the laws guaranteed in the fourteenth 
amendment of the Constitution of the United States is unenforceable. Suter v. Sz~ter, 97 
Idaho 461 (1976). Specifically, a statute that provides for a different classification of a 
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husband and wife solely on the basis of scx is unenforceable if the basis for that different 
classification is arbitrary and not reasonable. Id. A different classification is arbitrary 
and not reasonable if the different classification does not rest upon some ground of 
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation so that all 
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. Id. 
In Stlter v. Suter, supra, 97 Idaho at 461, the Idaho Supreme Court held that Idaho 
Code Section 32-909 was unconstitutional and therefore not enforceable. Idaho Code 
Section 32-909 read as follows: "Earnings of wife living separatc from husband. -- 
The earnings and accumulations of the wife and of her minor children living with her or 
in her custody, while she is living separate from her husband are the separate property of 
the wife." The court held that Idaho Code Section 32-909 was unconstitutional because it 
"results in unequal treatment for a husband and a wife as regards their individual earnings 
after a separation. The different classification of a husband and wife solely on the basis 
of sex 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon somc ground of difference 
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons 
similarly circun~stanced shall be treated alike."' Id. at 467 (quotations omitted). The 
court explained held that "the unequal treatment accorded a husband and wife through the 
operation of Idaho Code Section 32-909 is arbitrary on its face and demonstratcs no 
substantial relation to the object of comnlunity property legislation." Id. The court 
further explained that "Idaho Code Section 32-909 creates an unconstitutional distinction 
in the division of marital property upon divorce and therefore is a denial of the equal 
protection of the laws as guaranteed in the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of 
the United States." Id. 
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Here, Idaho Code Section 11-204 results in unequal trcatrnent for a husband and a 
wife as regards their individual earnings during marriage because it treats the earnings of 
the wife differently than the earnings of the l~usband. It exeinpts from garnishmeilt a 
wife's compensation "due and owing" without exempting from garnishment a husband's 
con~pensation "due and owing." This unequal treatment accorded between a husband and 
a wife through operation of Idaho Code Section 32-909 is arbitrary on its face and 
demonstrates no substantial relation to the object of comn~unity property legislation. 
In fact, Idaho Code Section 1 1-204 is contrary to the current object of community 
property law. When Idaho Code Section 1 1-204 was enacted in 188 1, Idaho's 
community property law was that the husband had the exclusive right to inailage and 
control all the community property except for the earnings of the wife for her personal 
services. McMillan v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 48 Idaho 163 (1929). On the other 
hand, the wife had the exclusive right to manage and control her community earnings 
resulting froill her own personal services. Id. If the law were the same today, Idaho 
Code Section 11-204 would bear a substantial relation to the object of community 
property law because execution against the husband should not extend to property over 
which he has no right to manage or control. However, in 1974, Idaho changed its 
cominunity property law so that "[elither the husband or the wife shall have the right to 
manage and control the community property." See 1974 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 194, 5 2 
and Idaho Code Section 32-912. Thus, today the husband has the right to manage and 
control a wife's community earnings resulting from her own personal services just as a 
wife has the right to manage and control a husband's con~munity earnings resulting from 
his own personal services. Given the change to the law in 1974, Idaho Code Section 11- 
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204 is actually contrary to current Ida110 con~munity property law because it exempts 
from garnishnlcilt a husband's interest in property that hc has every right to manage and 
control. Accordingly, Idaho Code Section 11-204 creates an uilconstitutional distinction 
in the treatment of marital property upon garnislunent and therefore is a denial of the 
equal protection of the laws as guaranteed in the fourteenth amendment of the 
Coilstitution of the United States. 
VI. CONCLUSION. 
For all the reasons set forth above, plaintiff respectfully requests that the court 
grant plaintiffs motion to contest claim of exemption. 
DATED this \-uv day of October, 2007 
McGRATH, MEACHAM & SMITH, PLLG 
By: 
~ c o r n e ~ s  for ~Mintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
w I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the \v day of October, 2007, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the forcgoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONTEST 
CLAIM OF EXEMPTION to be served, by placing the same in a sealed envelope and 
depositing it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or by causing the same to be 
delivered by hand, facsimile or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
[ ] U.8. Mail [ $dcsimile Transmission 
Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
Marvin M. Smith 
Anderson Nelson Hall Smith, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
c 
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490 Memorial Drive 
Post Office Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405- 1630 
Telephone (208) 522-3001 
Fax (208) 523-7254 
Attorneys for Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center 
IN TKE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL, DISTNCT 
OF T'HE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AN13 FOR T I E  COUNTY OF MADISON 
MAGISTRATE DMSION 
I CREDlT BUREAU OF EASTERN IDAHO, ; Case No. CV-06-130 
INC., an Idaho corporation, I 
I 
I 
MEMOIRANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
Plaintiff, 
I 
TO MOTION TO CONTEST 
I CLAIM OF EXEMPTION 
v. I 
I 
JEFF D. LECHEMMANT and LISA I 
LECHEMINANT, I I 
I 
Defendants. I 
COME NOW Third Party Eastern Idaho Regional Mehcal Center ("EIWC"), by and 
through its attorney of record, and hereby submits its Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to 
Contest Claim of Exemption. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho, Inc. obtainzd a judgment against Jeff Lecheminant and 
Lisa Lecheminant while they were married. JefYand Lisa divorced and subsequently Jeff 
LecheIblinant married Sandy Moulton, employed by EIRMC. Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho, 
Inc. is now attempting to  garnish Sandy Moultan's wages to satisfy its judgment against Jeff 
,ONTEST CLAW OF EXEMPTION - 1 
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Lecheminant, which was an antenuptial debt, 
ANALYSIS 
I. IDAHO CODE 5 11-204 IS A VALID CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE THAT HAS 
NEVER BEEN REPEALED. 
At the outset there is no doubt that wages earned by the parties during marriage are 
community property. This is clear in I.C. $ 32-906(1), which states; 
All other property acquired after marriage by either husband or wife is community 
property. The income of all property separate or c.ommunity, is community 
property unless the conveyance by which it is acquired provides or both spouses, 
by written agreement specificalIy so providing, declare that all or specifically 
designated property and the income from all or the specifically designated 
property shall be the separate property of one of the spouses of the income fiom 
all or specifically designated separate property be the separate property of the 
spouse to whom the property belongs. Such property shall be subject to the 
management of the spouse owning the propeq and shall not be liable for the 
debts of the other member of  the community. 
However, Idaho Code 5 11-204 states: 
All real and personal estate belonging to any married woman at the t ime of her 
rnarriqge, or to which she subsequently becomes entitled in her own right, and all 
the rents, issues and profits thereof. and all compensation due or o ~ i n g  for her 
personal services, is exempt from execution against her husband, 
Said statute creates a special kind of community property. Professor of Law W-,J. Broketbank 
noted in his 1962 book, The Communiv Propert): Law ofIdaho at pp.265-66; 
The Idaho legislature of 1881 set up a special kind of community property, viz., 
'kents, issues and profits" of the wife's separate property and "all compensation 
due or owing for her personal services" (both of which are community property in 
Idaho) and provided that this special kind of community property should be 
"exempt £ram execution against l ~ r  husband." 
The I a o  Supreme C o w  in McMil2an v. United Stares Fire Ins. Co., 48 Idaho 163, 270 
P.220 held: 
As to the earnings of a married woman, not living separate and apart from her 
:ONTEST CLAIM OF EXEMPTION - 7 
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husband, on account of her personal services, the exemption applies only to 
such earnings as are due and orving. After the earnings have been paid, or 
converted into other property, the exemption granted by said section no 
longer obtains. 
Id. at 280 P, 222 (emphasis added). 
In this case, the debts must be satisfied from the separate property of the debtor spouse 
(Jeff Lecheminant) or from non-exempt community property. Othervise: the judgment creditor 
obtains a windfall when a new community is formed. The separate property of the debtor spouse 
and non-exempt community prop* is still available to the Judgment creditor for satisfaction of 
the debt. Thus, certain property, like Ms. Moulton's wages, become shielded under the 
cornmunit). property laws, under I.C. 5 1 1-204. 
Plaintiff has assertcd that pursuant to I.C. 5 32-912 the antenuptial debts of one spouse 
binds the community property and bus makes the community assets available for execution. 
This section states that "Either the husband or the wife shall have the right to manage and control 
the cornmunit)) propem and either may bind the community by contract . . ." The Plaintip s 
argument is misplaced since the debt and judgment arose prior to the inception and existence of 
t h i s  cornmunity (with Ms. Moulton). The debts at issue in h s  case were not incurred during the 
existence of t tus community. The non-debtor spouse (Sandy Moulton) was not a party to the 
collection action against her husband and yet the Plaintiff has attempted to execute on the non- 
part).., non-debtor's spouse's interest in the present community property in violation of her due 
process rights. 
Since the PIaintiff in this case attempted to garnish Ms. Moulton's wages; which are 
exempt community per I.C. 5 11-204, the question then becomes whether or not a judgment 
creditor can attach the exempt community property of Ms. Moulton to satisfj- the antenuptial debt 
- - 
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of Ms. Moulton's present husband where she was neither aparty nor judgment debtor. The 
courts have held that if the debt was incurred for the benefit of the cornunity then the debt can 
be paid from the community property. The debt which gave rise to this action arose before this 
community was formed and was not incuned for the benefit of this community of Ms. Moulton. 
The community, therefore, is nor obligated to repay such debts from this particular comclnity 
property (wages), which is the exempt cornunity propzrty of Ms. Moulton under I.C. 3 1 1-204. 
The United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (applying Idaho law) in a matter 
regarding a foreclosure action stated, "Only if the debt is i n c u d  for the benefit of the 
community does I.C. 5 32-912 allow satisfaction of the unpaid debt fiom the community 
property." First Idaho Corporation v.  Davis, 867 F.2d 1241, 1243 (9' Cir. 1989). In Freeburn 
v. l+eeburn, 97 Idaho 845, 849,555 P.2d 3 85,3 89 (1 976) the Court held "The character of an 
item of property as community or separate vests at the time of its acquisition." (Citations 
omitted). Tlh is the logic that must be followed here, that the debt acquired by Mr. Lecheminant 
is separate in character since it was vested prior to the formation of the new community; or the 
debt is a community debt of a former community but cannot be satisfied out of the "present" 
special kind of community property created by I.C. $ 11-204, 
Upon reviewing Idaho case law, none have adkessed the specific question as to whether 
or not the special kind of community property created by I.C. $ 1 1-204, including wages, can be 
attached by a judgment creditor to satisfy an antenuptial debt of the hbtor spouse. However, 
there is case law indicating that community property classified under I.C. 5 204 cannot be used 
for that purpose. The subject debt was not incurred for the benefit of this present comrnuni~~; the
debt was not acquired during the existence of tlis community, and its very nature is separate in 
CONTEST CLAIM OF EXEMPTION 
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character in regard to the present community, 
Further, "[a] party challenging a statute on constituftonal grounds bears the burden of 
proving the statute is unconstitutional, and must overcome a e o a g  presumption of validity." In 
re Kurel, 144 Idaho 379, 162 P.3d 758, 762 (2007). 
Idaho Code $ 1  1-204 (in existence since 1881) has never been overturned by the ldaho 
Legislature and Idaho Supreme Court/Court of Appeal, respectively. By symmetry of reasoning 
it must be assumed that I.C. 9 11-204 applies equally to married men as it dozs married woman. 
This principle of extension has been approved in Idaho law. See e.g., ,Veveau v. Neveau, 103 
Idaho 707, 652 P.2d 655 (Ct. App. 1982); Harrigfeld v.  Dispicl Court, 95 Idaho 540, 5 1  1 P.2d 
822 (1973), The escmption provided by I.C. 5 11-204 is to be construed liberally in f b o r  of the 
debtor. See e.g., In Re Moore, 269 BR 864 (Bkxtcy D. Idaho 2001). Therefore, in this case the 
exemption should be construed even more liberally for Ms. Moulton becausz she is not the 
debtor: not a party to this suit, and was not even married to Jeff Lechemiaant when the debt was 
incurred. 
It is important to note that from 19 15 to 1974, by statute, a wife had the exclusive 
management and conk1  of her earnings, not her husband. Therefore, since 1974 the wife has 
actually had less control of her earnings not more. If Plaintiffs argument is acccpkd and Ms. 
Moulton is not granted the exemption given to her per I.C. 5 11-204, a married woman will 
effectively have no control over her earnings. 
In this case, the wages Saudy Moulton receives fiom ElRMC is compensation due or 
owing for her personal services Therefore, per I.C. 3 1 1-204 Smdy h4oulton's wages are 
exempt from execution against her husband. 
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11. SANDY MOULTON'S WAGES ARG NOT SUBJECT TO GARNISHMENT PER 
TIE IDAFIO SUPREME COURT~S  OILD DING IN ~ L E R  V, MILLER, 113 
xloAEI0 415 (1987). 
In Miller v, Miller, 113 Idaho 415: 420,745 P.2d 294,299 (1987) the Idaho Supreme 
Court stated and held: 
ARer the entry of the di&d court's judgment for damages against E. Paul, Pete 
filed pursuant to I.C. $ 8-509 (Supp. 1987) a motion for continuing garnishment 
against the wages of E. Paul's spouse, Paula Miller, Following a hearing, the 
court denied the motion on the ground of Pets's failure to name Paula as a perty 
defendant. The &strict court reasoned that allowjllg a garnishment of Paula's 
wages without having been made a parry defendant, and with the judgment having 
been entered only against her husband, would deny her due process of law. 
We agree with the district court's conclusion that the joinder of a spouse as a party 
defendant was a necessary prerequisite, under I.C. 5 8-509(b) . . . 
The language of I.C. 5 8-509 is specifically limited to a "judgment creditor" and a 
''judgment debtor." "A well-settled rule of collstruction is that the words of a 
statute must be given their plain, usual and ordinary meaning in the absence of 
any ambiguity,'' (Citations omitted). A judgment debtor according to Black's 
Lmv Dictionay (5' ed. 1979): p. 758 isJ "A person agavlst whom judgment has 
been recovered, and whch remains unsatisfied." Paula, l1a5ing not been a named 
party defendant, clearly did not qualify as a judgment debtor and, hence: was not 
within the scope of I.C. 3 8-509(b). 
The Miller case is closely analogous to the matter at hand. In this case, Sandy Moulton 
was not a party defendant and is not a '3udgment debtor" just as Paula Miller in the Miller case. 
If the Idaho Supreme Court would not alIow a continuing garnishment against someone who is 
not a "judgment debtor" then why would it allow any garnishment against someone who is not a 
"judgment debtor"? Thus, it is EIRb4C's position that  miller stands for the proposition that 
garnishment oi'any type can only be effected against persons who are actually party defendants in 
a suit and are judgment debtors. Therefore: because Sandy Moulton was not a party defendant in 
this matter and no judgment was entered against: her, the wages of Sandy Moulton can not be 
garnished. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the analysis, case law precedent, and statute set forth above, ElRMC 
respectllly requests that this Court deny PlaihtifYs  motion to Contest Claim of Exemption. 
DATED this #day of October, 2007. 
ANDERSON NELSON HALL SMITH, P .A. 
MARVIN M. SMITH, attorney for Eastern Idaho 
Regional Medical Center 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I reby certify that I: served a true copy of the foregoing document upon t he  following 
ay of October, 2007, by hand delivery, mailing with the necessw postage f l ied h s  ,$$ 
thereto, facsimile, or overnight mail. 
Bryan D. Smith 
MCGR4TH: MEACHAM & SMITH, PLLC 
3 14 S houp Avenue 
P.O. Box 5073 1 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
[ ] Mailing 
Hand Delivev 
[ I Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
h / l E M D R b \ N D l  JM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO -Om,AIma 7 
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Date: 4/8/2009 
Time: 12:08 PM 
Page 1 of 2 
Seventh Judicial District Court - Madison County 
Minutes Report 
Case: CV-2006-0000130 
User: GWEN 
Credit Bureau Of Eastern Idaho, Inc vs. Jeff D Lecheminant, etal. 
Selected Items 
Hearing type: Motion for Claim of Exemption Minutes date: 10/23/2007 
Assigned judge: Mark S. Rammell Start time: 11 :30 AM 
Court reporter: End time: 11 :30 AM 
Minutes clerk: Lori Ann Lewis Audio tape number: 
Prosecutor: [none] 
Tape Counter: 11 31 J INTRO 
COURT QUESTIONS MR. SMITH AS TO WHY ANOTHER WRlT WAS SUBMITTED 
AFTER BEING TOLD TWICE THAT THE COURT WOULD NOT SIGN IT 
COURT IS GOING TO RESCIND WRlT 
MR. SMITH EXPLAINS WHY IT WAS REISSUED 
COURT IS GOING TO RESCIND WRlT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
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HYKON K. S'I'OMMEL 
(208) 529-1350 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY SIIERIFF'S OFFICE ' !  
605 N CAPITAL 
IDA110 FALLS, ID 83402 
1 I 
p&er ID: 100705G7-6 - - -- -: 
1 
. . 
-*. -- +-.  
U N S A T I S F I E D  R E T U R N  O F  S E R V I C E  
CREDIT BUREAU OF EASTERN IDAHO 
-. vs -. PLAINTIFF(S) COURT: 7TH DIST. MADISON 
CASE NO: CV06130 
JEFFREY DARWIN 6r LISA LECHEMINANT 
DEFENDANT(S) PAPER(S) SERVED: 
NOTICE OF GARNISHMENT 
WRlT OF EXECUTION 
I, BYRON R. STOMMEL, SHERIFF OF BONNEVlLLE COUNTY, STATE THAT THE ABOVE DESCKIBED DOCUMENTS WERE 
DELIVERED TO ME FOR SERVICE ON THE 25TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2007. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT, ON THE 26TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2007, AT 4:00 O'CLOCK P.M., I, CHARLENE MUNNS, 
BEING DULY AUTHORIZED, SERVED THE ABOVE DESCRIBED DOCUMENTS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER 
BY LEVYING ON ANY PROPERTY, MONEY AND EFFECTS BELONGING TO THE DEFENDANT IN THE POSSESSION OF 
AT 3100 CHANNING WAY IDAHO FALLS ID 83404 
WITHIN THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE, STATE OF IDAHO, AND HAVING NOT SATISFIED THIS JUDGMENT, I AM 
RETURNING THE ABOVE DESCRIBED DOCUMENTS AS UNSATISFIED. 
PAPERS SERVED OR MAILED TO THE DEFENDANT: 
NOTICE OF GARNISHMENT 
WRlT OF EXECUTION 
CLM OF EXEMPTION & INSTRUCTION 
LEGAL NOTICE OF EXEMPTIONS 
COMMENTS: SERVED BY MAILING THE GARNISHMENT PAPERWORK TO THE GARNISHEE MARKED ATTENTION 
HUMAN RESOURCES AT 3100 CHANNING WAY, IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83404 ON 9-26-2007. 
MAILED THE EXEMPTION PACKET TO THE DEFENDANTS JEFF & LISA LECHEMIANT AT 259 J 
STREET, IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83402 ON 9-26-2007. ALSO MAILED THE EXEMPTION 
PACKET TO SANDY MOULTON AKA LECHEMIANT AT 259 J STREET, IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 
83402 ON 9-26-2007. A COPY OF THE EXEMPTION SHEET WAS ALSO SERVED TO 
E.I.R.M.C.. THE GAiiNlSHMEi\iT FOR STATED THAT THE EARNINGS OF SANDY MOULTON AKA 
SANDY LECHEMINANT ARE THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY OF JEFF D. LECHEMINANT AND 
THEREFORE THE ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFF WAS ATTACHING ANY MONEY. CREDITS, OR 
OTHER PERSONAL PROPERTY BELONGING TO SANDY MOULTON AKA SANDY LECHEMINANT OR 
DEBTS, ACCOUNTS OR OTHER AMOUNTS OR PAYMENTS OWING TO SANDY MOULTON AKA SANDY 
LECHEMINANT. RECEIVED INTERROGATORIES ON 10/18/2007: SANDY IS EMPLOYED FULL 
TIME WITH AN AVERAGE TAKE HOME PAY OF $2237.19 WHICH IS PAID BIWEEKLY. 
RECEIVED A FAX FROM THE ATTORNEY TO RELEASE THE GARNISHMENT AND TO RELEASE ANY 
MONEY TO THE DEFENDANT. ISSUED SHERIFF CHECK # 4727 IN THE AMOUNT OF $618.62 
TO THE DEFENDANT. ORIGINALS RETURNED TO COURT. 
CHARGES DATED THIS 30TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2007 
JUDGMENT AMOUNT: 
SHERIFF'S FEES: 
TOTAL: 
972.20 
BYRON R. STOMMEL 
40.00 
.......-..-. SHERIFF 
1,012.20 
UNSATISFIED RETURN OF SERVICE 
(WRIT 912 1/07) 
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BONNEVILLE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
BYRON K. STOMMEL 605 N CAPITAL paper ID: 200705676 
(208) 529-1350 IDAHO FALLS, ID 83402 \ ,  
U N S A T I S F I E D  R E T U R N  O F  S E R V I C E  
PAYMENTS BY 
&6i4 U-*e 
APPLIED TO JUDGMENT: 0.00 CHARLENE MUNNS 
APPLIED TO FEES 0 00 
.. -. .... .. 
SERVING OFFICER 
TOTAL COLLECTED TO DATE L, 0.00 
. . - . . . . BY &?,( 7Lfa ?Zd7 ff&fLl 
AMOUNT UNCOLLECTED 1,012 20 MELYNDA RoBlNsoN TORINGREN ,j / 
RETURNING OFFICER 
UNSATISFIED RETURN Ok' SLKVICE 
(WRIT 912 1/07) 
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?!$I S fP  25 PN 4:  38 
Re; Clredit B~areau of Eastern Idaho, Inc v. Jeff D, and Lisa LecheWaHit3 ': :[:. E (:a LINT 'f 
llIadison County Case Number CV-06-130 5).1t, RIFI- '5 PEPT, 
I I I L r l t ~ ? )  I- ALi., I O A H O  I QCCKIVED 
STATUTORY INTERROOATONES: 
I 
TO: Eastern Idaho Rcgiond Medical Center 
TAKE! NOTICE that dl money, wagcs, goods, credits, effects, tents due, and all other personal 
property in your possession or under your control, belonging to the defenclant named in the 
attached copy of the writ of execution is  levied upon and upon and you are hereby notified n o w  
pay or transfer the same to anyone but the oflice of the sheriff. WAGES are subject~c&$i&h 
_7 
garnishment provisions of Title I11 of the Consumer Credit Protective Ave (1 5 
g - a , c - q  DATE 
ANSWER OF GARNISHEE: 
I 
, i 
I 
PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWmG NTERROGATONES. IDAHO CODE - 1 
providc;s that the garnishee shall makc full and true answer to interrogatories within five (5 )  &s 
or the plaintiff may take judgment against him by default. 
I 
> 
I I .  FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS; Do you have in your possession or undcr your control 
any money or property belonging to the defendant (s)? I ~e5- (nJw 
knoutit W > F ~ ~ & g ~ a ~ i 5  l Q I 2 ( 0 1 ~ .  5 -  
2. Is e Defendant yow employee? \/CS 2 Full Time - Part Time Contract 
3. m , a t  i s  hisher average take home gay7 2,237.1 When paid? eM<y ~f'w ff1d9 
- 
1. Do you owe the Defendant any money? Yes No J 
I 
If so, how much and when did it become d u ~ ?  
If not yet dme, when will it becomc due? W i 1' b4 0-4. 10 I& / 0? . 
2. Has the defendant assigned hisher wages? Yes- Nc J ' 
When and to whom was the assignment made? 
/ 3. Are you honoring any other garnishments? Yes- No- 
If so, what state and county serve the garnishment? 
4. ' If the Defendant no longer works for you, when did hisher employment end? 
- 
M%o docs he/she work for now? 
wQusI~.&;i G ~ r ~ l ; f b , w . u ? ~ c : d d  (Q/IT/GP, 
GAFNISIIEE TITLE DATE 
I UPJ SA-F~ERWCE 
(WRIT 912 1/07) 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
ISB # 441 1 
McGRATH, MEACI-IAM & SMITH, PLLC 
4 14 Shoup Avenue 
P.O. Box 5073 1 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
(208) 524-073 1 
Attorileys for Plaintiff 
1N TI-IE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
CREDIT BUREAU OF EASTERN IDAHO, 
lNC., an Idaho corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
JEFF D. LECHEMINAN?' and LJSA 
LECHEMIANT, 
Case No. CV-06- 130 
WRIT OF EXECUTION 
Defendants. 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
To the Sheriff of the County of Bonneville, 
GREETINGS : 
Judgment 
Costs 
Interest 
Payments 
Total $972.20 
WHEREAS, the plaintiff, Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho, Inc, recovered judgment in 
the said District Court in the said County of MADISON, against JEFF D. LECHEMINANT and 
LISA LECHEMIANT on March 28,2006, for the sum of $833.16, with interest at the legal rate 
UNSATISFIED RETURN OF SERVICE 
(WRIT 912 1/07) 
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for juhginents as prescribed by Idaho Code $ 28-22-104 until paid, together with costs and 
disbursements at the datc or  said judgment and accruing costs as appear to us on record. 
And whereas, the judgnlent roll in the action in which said judgillent was entered is filed 
in the Clerk's office of said Court in said County of MADISON, and the said judgment was 
docketed in said Clerk's office in the said County, 011 the day and year first above written. 
And the sum of $833.16 with interest in the amount of $103.04, plus costs of $36.00, less 
payinents of $0.00 for a total of $972.20 is now-as of Seplember 19, 2007--actually due on 
said judgment. 
NOW, THEREFORE, YOU, the said Sheriff, are hereby required to malie the said suills 
due on said judgment with interest as aforesaid, and costs and accruing costs, to satisfy said 
judgnlent in full out of the personal property of said debtor, or if sufficient personal property of 
said debtor cannot bc found, then out ofthe real property in your County bclonging to the deb!or 
on the day whereon said judgment was docketed in said County, or at any time thereafter. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code $ 1 1 - 103 you may nlalie return hereon not less than 10 nor more than 60 
days after your receipt hereof, with what you have done endorsed thereon. 
WITNESS HON% r L 5 .  m Judge 
of the said District Court, at the Courthouse in the 
County of MADISON, this 31 September, 
2007. 
ATTEST my hand and seal of said Court the day 
,,,,?, \ \~ , l ' '" ' ; ! f ! , , r ,  
~,.:. . , . ., ., : ;.: .: :!',:, . and year last above written. 
" ,.. '// 
. . . .  , . * , . .  . 
, . - -  . . , " 
.: 
, ;3>Y: i Y' <;> ,.L*;* +, . . .  
:. 1 ,  ,'C; . , : , p * , . ,  .,*. ,., 
. . . *. -:fi.r. .A*.- 
. >.. -, 0 - , , k i \ t  .!<-, , i, , :d ,&$f,J&.b- 
.. . " -- 
~ ~ T ' U ' - I C E  
(WRIT 9/2 1 /07) 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
I~lcrho State Bar Nztrnbcr: 441 1 
McCIIATI-I, MEACHAM & SMITH, PLLC 
4 14 Shoup Avenue 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
(208) 524-073 1 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTI-I JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
CREDIT BUREAlJ OF EASTERN 
IDAHO, INC., an Idaho corporation 
JEFF D. LECHEMINANT and LISA 
LECI-IIZMINANT, 
Case No. CV-06-130 
ORDER 
Defendant. I 
THIS CAUSE having come up regularly for hearing before the Court on October 
23, 2007, pursuant to plaintiffs Motion to Coiltest Claim of Exemption and plaintiff 
appeariilg by and through counsel of rccord Bryan D. Smith, Esq., of the firin McGrath, 
Meacham & Smith, PLLC, and defendant appearing by and through counsel of record 
Marvin M. Smith, Esq., of the firill Anderson, Nelson, I-Iall, Smith, P.A.; and the Court 
having coilsidered the records filed herein and having heard and considered oral 
argument from counsel, and otherwise being fully advised ill the premises: 
ORDER 
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1. 
hereby 
NOW, TI-IEREFORE, it shall be the order of'this Court and it is hereby ordered: 
That plaiiltiff's Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption is DENIED; and the court 
grants the defendant's claim of exemption. 
MADE AND ENTERED this 9 day of February,j~08. 
ORDER 
PAGE 54 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _kL day of February, 2008, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to be served, by placing the same in a sealed 
envelope and depositing it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or by causing thc 
sainc to be delivered by hand, facsimile or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
U.S. Mail Marvin M.  Smith 
] Facsimile Transn~ission < Anderson Nelson Hall Smith, P.A. 
[ ] Hand Delivery 490 Meillorial Drive 
[ 1 Overnight Delivery Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
acsimile Transmission 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
McGrath, Meacham & Smith, PLLC 
P. 0. Box 5073 1 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-073 1 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
ISB # 441 1 
McGRATH, MEACHAM & SMITH, PLLC 
4 14 Shoup Avenue 
P.O. Box 5073 1 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
(208) 524-073 1 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
CREDIT BUREAU OF EASTERN IDAHO, 
INC, an Idaho corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
JEFF D. LECHEMINANT and LISA 
LECHEMINANT 
Defendants. I 
Case No. CV-06- 130 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT: 
Marvin M. Smith, ESQ., 490 Memorial Drive, IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83405, AND TO 
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named appellant, Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho, Inc., appeals against 
the above-named respondent, Jeff Lecheminant and Lisa Lecheminant, husband and wife, to the 
District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Madison, fiom the court's Order Denying Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption signed 
February 20,2008 by Magistrate Mark S. Rammell. 
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2. Appellant has the right to appeal to the District Court, and the memorandum 
decisions, orders, and judgment described in paragraph 1 above are subject to appeal pursuant to 
Rule 1 1 (a), Idaho Appellate Rules. 
3. The issues which the appellant intends to assert in the appeal are the following: 
a. Under Idaho community property law, call the community wages of one 
spouse be used to satisfy the separate debt of the other spouse? 
b. If the community wages of one spouse can be used to satisfy the separate 
debt of the other spouse, are those wages subject to execution by garnishment pursuant to 
Idaho Code Section 8-507 or another permissible statute? 
c. If the community wages of one spouse are subject to execution by 
garnishment pursuant to Idaho Code Section 8-507 or another permissible statute to 
satisfy the separate debt of the other spouse, does Idaho Code Section 1 1-204 apply on a 
claim of exemption or is the statute unconstitutional? 
4. There has been no order entered sealing any portion of the record in this case. 
5. The appellant requests no transcript be prepared on appeal. 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's 
record in addition to those auto~natically included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules: The 
entire magistrate court file. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That the appellate filing fee has becn paid; 
(b) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20, Idaho Appellate Rules. 
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oEoh  DATED this v day of February, 2008. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this  day oCFebruary, 2008, I caused a true and 
corrcct copy of the forgoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served, by placing the same in a 
sealed envelope and depositing it in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile 
trailsnlission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
Marvin M. Smith 
Anderson Nelson Hall Smith, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR MADISON COIJNTY 
CREDIT BUREAU OF EASTERN 1 
IDAHO, and Idaho corporations, 1 
1 
Petitioner, 1 Case No. CV-06- 130 
1 
VS. 1 
1 ORDER GOVERNING 
1 PROCEDURE ON APPEAL 
JEFF D. LECHEMINANT and LISA 1 
LECHEMINANT, 
1 
Respondents. 1 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(f), Appellants filed a notice of appeal with this Court on 
February 26, 2008, in which they appeal a February 20,2008 Judgment from the 
Magistrate Division of the District Court for Madison County, Honorable Mark S. 
Rammell, Magistrate Judge, presiding. Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. This appeal shall be determined on the record; 
2. A transcript of the proceedings in the Magistrate Division shall be 
prepared at appellant's expense pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83 (j) and (k) unless, 
after a motion by one of the parties and a hearing, this Court determines a 
transcript is unnecessary; 
3. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(v) and I.A.R. 34, briefs shall be submitted to this 
Court according to the following schedule: 
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(a) Appellant's brief shall be filed with this Court within thirty-five 
(35) days of the date of notice that the transcript and record have 
been filed with this Court; 
(b) Respondent's brief shall be filed with this Court within twenty- 
eight (28) days after service of Appellant's brief; and 
(c) Appellant's reply brief, if any, shall be filed with this Court within 
twenty-one (21) days after service of Respondent's brief. 
4. The original briefs shall be filed with the Clerk of the Madison County 
District Court, located at 134 East Main, Rexburg, Idaho, 83440. Briefs 
need not be bound or covered. A simple staple and white paper will 
suffice. 
5. When all the foregoing requirements have been complied with, Appellant 
shall arrange a hearing for oral argument at the next convenient Law and 
Motionday following the expiration of the time limit for the filing of 
Appellant's reply brief. Oral argument shall be scheduled for hearing 
at the Madison County Courthouse in Rexburg, Idaho. Notice of the 
hearing date shall be served upon this Court and counsel for the 
respondent. If no hearing is sclieduled, this Court will assume that 
thc appcal has been submitted for decision without argument. 
DATED this day of March, 2008. 
Brent J. Moss 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I I-IEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was 
served upon the individuals listed below via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on this 
3 day of March, 2008: 
Bryan D. Smith 
McGRATH, MEACHAM & SMITH, PLLC 
4 1 4 Shoup Avenue 
P.O. Box 5073 1 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Marvin M. Smith 
ANDERSON, NELSON, HALL, SMITH, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Attorney for Respondent 
Clerk of the Court n 
By: 
v 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
ISB # 4411 
MCGRATI-I, SMITH & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
4 14 Shoup Avenue 
P.O. Box 5073 1 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
(208) 524-073 1 
RECEIVED A/',i - 2 201  
I 
i Attorneys for Plaintiff - - -  -..a 
I 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAI-10, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
VS. 
CREDIT BUREAU OF EASTERN IDAHO, 
INC, an Idaho corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
JEFF D. LECHEMINANT and LISA 
LECHEMINANT, 
Case No. CV-06-130 
STIPULATION GOVERNING 
PROCEDURE ON APPEAL 
Defendants. 
COME NOW the above parties, plaintiff, Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho, Inc., by 
and ihr-~~igh its attorney of record, B:ym D. Smith. Esq., of the firm McGrath, Smith & 
Associates, PLLC, and Defendant, Jeff D. Lecheminant, by and through their attorney of 
record, Marvin M. Smith, of the firm Anderson, Nelson, Hall, Smith P.A., and stipulate 
as follows: 
1. It is not necessary to transcribe the reporter's transcript in this case. 
2. The court may enter an order obviating the requirement that the transcript 
be prepared. 
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3. Upon service after entry of such an order, appellant shall have 35 days to 
file its opening brief on appeal pursuant to the court's Order Governing Procedure on 
Appeal dated March 3, 2008 and at which time all f~~r ther  deadlines contained in that 
order shall become of effect. 
DATED this 
4% 6 day of April, 2008. 
McGRATH, SMITH & ASSOC1ATESJ;PLLC 
, Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Attorney for Defendant 
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APPEAL 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
ISB # 441 1 
McGRATH, SMITH, & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Avenue 
P.O. Box 5073 1 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
(208) 524-073 1 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
CREDIT BUREAU OF EASTERN IDAHO, 
INC, an Idaho corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
JEFF D. LECHEMINANT and LISA 
LECHEMINANT, 
Case No. CV-06-130 
ORDER 
Defendants. 
Upon stipulation of the parties and good cause appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, as follows: 
1. The parties need not have a reporter's transcript prepared on appeal; 
2. Within 35 days of service of this order, the plaintiff shall file its opening 
brief on appeal pursuant to the court' Order Governiilg Procedure on 
Appeal dated March 3,2008; and 
3. All further deadlines contained in the Order Governing Procedure on 
Appeal dated March 3,2008 shall bccome of cffcct as stated in said order 
upon the filing of this Order. 
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t Pp; I 
DATED this /O day of R4arsk, 2008. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on this // day o $ & d - 2 0 0 8 ,  I caused a true 
and correct copy of the forgoing ORDER to be served, by placing the same in a sealed 
envelope and depositing it in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile 
transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
PARTIES SERVED: 
2 .-] U.S. Mail [ -1 Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
Marvin M. Smith 
Anderson Nelson Hall Smith, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Bryan D. Smith 
McGrath, Smith & Associates, PLLC 
P.O. Box 5073 1 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
& 
Clerk of Court 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
Idaho State Bar # 441 1 
MCGRATH, SMITH & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
4 14 Shoup Avenue 
P.O. Box 5073 1 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
(208) 524-073 1 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN TTIE DISTRICT COIJRT OF TI-IE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
CREDIT BIJREAU OF EASTERN IDAHO, 
INC., AN IDAHO CORPORATION, 
Petitioner, 
Case No. CV-06-130 
PLAINTIFF'S BIUEF ON APPEAL 
VS. 
JEFF D. LECHEMINANT and LISA 
LECHEMIANT, husband and wife 
Respondents. 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
This matter comes before the court on appeal from the magistrate's order dated 
February 20,2008 dcnying thc motion filed by Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho, Inc. 
("CBEI") to contest the claim of exemption filed by Jeff Lecheminant ("Lecherninant.") 
The factual and procedural history are set forth below. 
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11. FACTUAL PROCEDURAI, E-IISTORY. 
DATE EVENT 
March 28, 2006 T11e court cntcrs judgment against Jeff Lecheminant and 
Lisa Leclicminant in the amount of $833.16; 
Septeinber 5,2006 Counsel for CBEI met with Jeff Lecheminant who said (1) 
he was self employed as a contractor; and (2) he was 
married to Sandy Moulton who was worlting at Eastern 
Idaho Regional Medical Center (EIRMC) as a nurse; 
September 26, 2006 CBEI files a11 Application for on Order for Coiltinuing 
Garnishment, Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith in Support of 
Execution, Order For Coiltinuing Garnishment, and Writ of 
Execution; the continuing garnislunent seeks to garnish 
Sandy Moulton's community property wages at EIRMC; 
September 28, 2007 The Court enters the Order for Continuing Garnishment; 
Dccember 2006 Thc Bonncvillc Couilty Shcriff rcfuses to serve Order for 
Continuing Garnishment saying that CBEI could not 
garnish Sandy Moulton's wages at EIRMC; 
Ja~luary 2007 The court cleric tells CBEI's paralegal that "per Judge 
Ranln~ell, you callnot garnish Sandy Moulton's wagcs"; thc 
court clerk states that under Miller v. Miller, 1 13 Idaho 41 5 
(1 987) a writ for continz~ous garnishment cannot be issued 
against a defendant's spouse; 
January 15,2007 CBEI files Application for Order for Garnishment, 
Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith in Support of Execution, Order 
for Garnishment, and Writ of Execution; 
September 25,2007 CBEI sends garnishment to EIRMC to garnish the wages 
of Sandy Mo~rltoll who is married to Jeff Lecheminant (the 
Bonlleville C,ounty Sheriff serves the garnishment this 
time); 
October 15, 2007 Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center files a claiin of 
exemption for itself and Sandy Moulton; 
October 17, 2007 CBEI filcs its motion to contest claim of exemption; and 
October 23, 2007 Hearing set on CBEI's Motion to Contest Claim of 
Exenlption where court denies CBEI's motion; 
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February 20, 2008 Court clitcl-s written order dcnying CREI's Motion to 
Contest Claim of Exemption; and 
February 27, 2008 CBE files its Notice of Appeal. 
111. ISSUE ON APPEAL. 
A. Under Idaho conlmunity property law, can the commullity wages of one 
spousc bc uscd to satisfy thc scparate debt of the other spouse? 
B. If the community wages of one spouse can be used to satisfy the separate 
debt of the other spouse, are those wages subject to execution by ganlishnent pursuant to 
Idaho Code Section 8-507 or another permissible statute? 
C,. If the conlnlunity wages of one spouse are subject to execution by 
garnishment pursuant to Ida110 Code Section 8-507 or another permissible statute to 
satisfy the separate debt of the other spouse, does Idaho Code Section 11 -204 apply on a 
claim of exemption or is the statute unconstitutional? 
D. Can CBEI recover attorney's fees on appeal? 
IV. IDAHO CASE 1,AW HOT,DS THAT COMMUNITY PROPERTY CAN 
SATISFY THE SEPARATE DEBT OF ONE OF THE SPOUSES. 
A. Idaho Case Law. 
Idaho law first addressed in Holt v. Enzpey, 32 Idaho 106 (1 9 19) the extent to 
which con~inunity property can be liable for the separate debt of a spouse. In Holt, the 
real property of Empey's husband was attached by I-Iolt to satisfy a debt that the 11~1sband 
had incurred as a surety for a third party. Empey intervened in the action, alleging that 
the propcrty attached was colnmunity property and not subject to levy for the separate 
debt of her husband. The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed stating, "We therefore hold that 
c ~ ~ n m u n i t y  real estate is liable to attachment and execution for the debts of the husband, 
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whether incurred for his own use or for the benefit of the community." fIoll v. Empey, 
supra, 32 Idaho 110. Although it is unclear from the court's opinion whether the 
husband's debt was incurred before or during the marriage, the conimunity property was 
liable regardless of whether the debt was antenuptial or postnuptial. See JOANN 
HENDERSON, IDAHO LAW FOUNDTION, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW OF 
IDAHO ch. 9, at 15 (1 982). 
In Gtistin v. Byam, 41 Idaho 538 (1925), Gustiii and her husband lived on land 
owned by Gustin's father under an arrangement whereby the husband was to farin the 
land during the year and give one-half of the crops to the father for use of the land. 
During the marriage, the husband gave a note to his brother secured by a chattel mortgage 
covering the whole of the crops, including the share of Gustin's father. At the father's 
insistence, the mortgage was subsequently released by the brother. At around the same 
time, the brother endorsed the note to a hardware company, which thcn brought suit to 
collect 011 the note. A default judgment was obtained, and the husband's share of the 
crops was levied upon and sold in order to satisfy the judgment. Gustin filed an action 
seel<ing to set aside the judglnent and to recover the value of the crops, claiming that the 
crops were colnnlunity property and exenlpt from execution. 
On appeal from a judgment entered in favor of the defendants, the Idaho Supreme 
Court noted that at that time, I.C. $ 32-912 gave the husband the inanageinent and control 
of the comnl~~nity property, with f~11l power of aliellation except as provided in the 
statute. Ainong the powers the husband could exercise alone was the sale of con~munity 
personal property, whether it was exempt from execution or not. Relying on the holding 
in HoS the Court held that the colnmunity properly was liable for the separate debts of 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
PAGE 70 7.677\1'lcadings\0013 Plaintiff's appellate brief..doc 
the l~usband as well as for con~munity debts. The Court said, "[tlhe community property 
is liable for the separate debts of the husband as well as for community debts." Gtlstin v. 
Bya~~t ,  su~~un ,  4 1 Idaho 53 8 at 603. Consequently, Gustin was unable to recover the 
property sold. 
Both Holt and Gustin were decided at a time when the husband was given solc 
power to manage and control the community property by statute. In 1974, the legislature 
amended I.C. § 32-912, giving the husband and the wife equal management and control 
of the community property. See 1974 Idalao Sess. Laws ch. 194, § 2. Despite the change 
in the management and control of thc community property and in spite of any doubt 
concerning the continued vitality of Holt and Gzlstin, those cases were cited with 
approval by our Supreme Court in B1i.s.s v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170 (1995), where the court 
cited Holt, Gustin, and Crapo, Equal Managentent of Community Property: Creditors' 
Rights, 13 Idaho L. Rev. 177, 178 (1977), for the proposition that '7p)arties often marry 
tvitli separate antelzuptial debts, ant1 tlzose debts are payable from conzmunity 
property." Id. at 173 (elalphasis added.) 
More recently, in Aclion Collection Service, Inc. v. Seele, 138 Idaho 753 (Ct. App. 
2003), the Court of Appeals held that the separate vrop~rty debt of one spouse can be 
satisficd out of the community propcrty wages of that spousc. The court reasoned that 
the elevation of the status of wives to equal managers of the commuulity property by 
virtue of the amendment to Idaho statutes, without a spccific exemption of the liability of 
the conlinunity property for each spouse's separate debts, suggests that the legislatulse 
intended for the rules of law enunciated in Holt alld Gustin to apply equally to the 
husband and the wife after anlendment of the statute. Therefore, just as the community 
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property in those cases was liable for the separate debts of one spouse, whether 
antenuptial or postnuptial, the community property wages were liable to satisfy the 
separate property judgment of one spouse. 
Therefore, just as the community property in Holt, Gustin, and most recently 
Action Collection was liable for the separate debts of one spouse, the community wages 
of Lecheminant's spouse are liable to satisfy CBEI's judgment against Lechcminant. As 
stated in Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho at 173: "Parties often marry witlz separate antenziptinl 
rlebts, and tlzose rlebts are payable from communityproperty." Id. at 173 (emphasis 
added.) 
B. Idaho Statutory Law. 
Under Idaho Code Section 32-912, "[elither the husband or the wife shall have the 
right to manage and control the community property." Here, there can be no dispute that 
the wages of Lecheminant's spouse are cominunity property in which Lecheminant has 
an interest. ,See Martsch v. Martsch, 103 Idaho 142, 147 (1 982) ("All salaries are 
community property, unlike rents and profits where only net proceeds are community 
property.") This meals that Lecheminant has the right to illallage and control 100% of 
his spouse's wages. 
Moreover, Idaho Code Section 1 1-201 identifies the property in Idaho that is 
subject to execution as follows: 
Property liable to seizure.-All goods, chattels, moneys and otlzer 
property, both real and personal, or any interest tlrerein of tlze judgment debtor, 
not cxempt by law, and all property alzd riglzts ofproperty, seized and held under 
attachment in the action, are liable to execution. Shares and interest in any 
corporation or company, and debts and credits, and all otlter property botlz real 
andpersonal, or any interest in either real orpersolzalproperty, and all other 
property not capable of n~anual delivery, may be attached on execution in like 
manner as upon writs of attachment. (Emphasis added.) 
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The phrases "otlter property, both real and personal, or any interest tlzereilz of tlze 
. I ' .  . .  
judgment debtor, not exempt by law, and call property and riglzts of property" and "all 
otlzer property both real and personal, or any interest in eitlter real or personal 
property" are broad enough to include "community property" generally defined as "all 
property acquired during marriage." Idaho Code Section 32-906. 
All these statutory provisio~ls are further supportive of Idaho case law that a 
judgment creditor can satisfy a judgment against a judgment debtor from the community 
property wages of the judgment debtor's spouse. 
C. The Wages Of Lecheminant's Spouse Are Con~munitv Property Subiect 
To Execution. 
Here, CBEI has a judgment against, Lecheminant who is married to Sandy 
Moulton who receives wages from her employlnent at Eastern Idaho Regional Medical 
Center. Sandy's wages are community property. Under Idaho case law, these wages are 
liable to satisfy Lecheininallt's separate property judgment against him. Under Idaho 
statutory law, Lecheminant has the right lo manage and control 100% of Sandy's wages 
therefore making Sandy's wages subject to execution and garnishment. 
V. ALTHOUGH THE COMMUNITY WAGES OF SANDY MOULTON ARE 
NOT SUBJECT TO AN ORDER FOR CONTINUING GARNISHMENT, THEY 
ARE SUBJECT TO GARNISHMENT. 
Idaho case law established in Holt, Gustin, Bliss, and Action Collection all stands 
for the proposition that the community wages of Lecheminant's spouse are liable to 
satisfy CBEl's judgment against Lecheminant. The issue is by what method CBEI can 
attach those con~lnutlity wages. CBEI sublllits that Idaho law prohibits such attachment 
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by way of an order for continz~ing garr~ishment. See Miller v. Miller, szrpra, 11 3 Idaho at 
41 5. However, Idaho law allows such attachlnent by way of garnishment. 
A. The Community Wanes Of A Defendant Spouse Are Not Subject To 
Attachment By An Ordergf Continuous Gamishnlent. 
In Miller v. Miller, supra, 1 13 Idaho at 41 5, the court addressed whethcr a 
judgment only against a husband could be enforced by way of an order for corztin~~ous 
garnishment against the wages of the jud-gment defendant's wife. The court did not 
address the issue of whether the wages of a judgment debtor's spouse are or are not 
subject to "levy," "execution," or "garnishnent." Specifically, the husband had been 
sued for trespass and a judgment was entered against him. The plaintiff obtained an order 
of co~ztirz~lot~s garnishment against the wages of the judgn~eilt defendant's wife. The 
judgnlent defendant's wife was not a party to the underlying lawsuit. The issue arose 
wl~ethes the order of contin~lous garnislment could be issued against the wages of the 
judgmellt defendant's wife given that she was not on the judgment. 
The court held that "joinder of a spguse as a party defendant was a necessary 
prerequisite, ~lnder I.C. Section 8-509(b)." Id. at 420. Idaho Codc Section 8-509(b), 
which deals with an order for contirzuoz~s garnishment, reads as follows: 
(b) When the garnishee is the employer of the judgment debtor, the 
judgment creditor, upon application to the court, shall have issued by the clerk of 
court, a continuing garnishment directing the employer-garnishee to pay to the 
sheriff such f~lture moneys coming due to the judgnlent debtor as may come due 
to said judgment debtor as a result of the judgment debtor's employmellt. This 
contii~uing garnishment shall continue in force and effect until the judglneilt is 
satisfied. The creditor shall be solely responsible for insuring that the amounts 
garnished do not exceed the airlount due on the judgment. 
The court reasoned that "[tlhe language of LC. Section 8-509 is specifically linlited to a 
'judgment creditor' a id  a 'judgment debtor.' 'A well-settled rule of construction is that 
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the words of a statute must be given their plain, usual and ordinary ineaning in the 
absence of any ambiguity.' A judgment debtor according to Rlack!~ Law Dictionary (5th 
ed. 1979), p. 758 is, 'A person against whom judgment has been recovered, and which 
renlains unsatisfied.' Paula, having not been a named party defendant, clearly did not 
qualify as a judgment debtor and, hence, was not within the scope of I.C. Section 8- 
509(b)." Miller v. Miller, szlprrr, 13 Idaho at 420. 
In other words, the plaintiff in Miller could not get an order of continziocls 
garnislment because the wife's employer (the garnishee) was not the employer of the 
judgment debtor (the husband debtorldefendant). Miller stands for the proposition that a 
judgment creditor cannot get ail order of corztinuoiis garilishn~ent against the wages of a 
spouse because of the limitations contained in I.C. Section 8-509. Miller does not even 
address the issue whether a judgnleilt creditor can execute by garnishment the wages of 
the judgrnent defendant's spouse. 
B. The Coinin~nity Wages Of A Defendant Spouse Are Subject To 
Execution By Garnishment. 
Idaho Code Section 8-507, states, in pertinent part, that upon written directions 
from the plaintiff or his attorney, the sherill shall execute and garnish "property 
belonging to the defendant": 
8-507. Garnishment - Service of writ of attachment, execution, or  
garnishment - Banks.-(a) Upon receiviilg written directioils from the plaintiff 
or his attorney, that any person or corporation , public or private, has in his or its 
possession or control, any credits or other persolla1 property belongiilg to the 
defendant, or is owing any debt to the defendant, the sheriff shall serve upon any 
such person, or corporation identified in the plaintiffs written directions all of the 
following docun~ents: 
(1) a copy of the writ; 
(2) a ilotice tllat such credits, or other property, or debts, as the case 
nlay be, are attached in pursuance of such writ; 
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(3) a notice of exemptiolls available under federal and state law; 
(4) instructions to debtors and third parties for asserting a claim of 
exemption; 
( 5 )  a form for making a claim of exemption; and 
( 6 )  if the garnishee is a bank or depository institutio~l, a search fee of 
five dollars ($5.00) and the last known mailing address of thc 
defendant and, ir  known, a tax identification number, that will 
enable the garnishee to identify the defendant on its records. 
Here, Lecheminant has the right to manage and control 100% of Sandy's 
comlnunity wages at EIRMC. For this reason, and all the other reasons cited in this brief, 
Sandy's community wages constitute "property belonging to him." Accordingly, Sandy's 
colnn~unity wages are subject to execution and garnishment by virtue of Idaho Code 
Section 8-507(a). 
V. THE EXEMPTION THAT EASTERN IDAHO REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER RELIES UPON NOT ENFORCEABLE BECAUSE IT IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
A statute that denies equal protection of the laws guaranteed in the fourteenth 
alneildinent of the Constitution of the IJnited States is unenforceable. Suter v. Szller, 97 
Idaho 461 (1976). Specifically, a statute that provides for a different classification of a 
husband and wife solely on the basis of sex is ullenforceable if the basis for that dirferent 
classification is arbitrary and not reasonable. Id. A different classification is arbitrary 
and not reasonable if the different classification does not rest upon some ground of 
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislatioil so that all 
persons sin~ilarly circ~umstanced shall be treated alike. Id. 
In Sz~ter v. Szite~, szlpra, 97 Idaho at 46 1, the Idaho Supreme Court held that Idaho 
Code Section 32-909 was unconstitutional and therefore not enforceable. Idaho Code 
Section 32-909 read as follows: "Earnings of wife living separate from husband. -- 
The earnings and accumulations o r  the wife and of her minor children living with her or 
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i n  her custody, while slie is living scparatc from her husband arc the separate property of 
thc wife." The court held that Idaho Code Section 32-909 was unconstit~ltional because it 
"lcsults in unequal treatnient for a husband and a wife as regards their individual earnings 
after a separation. The different classification of a husband and wife solely on the basis 
of sex 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon sonle ground of difference 
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons 
sinlilarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."' Id. at 467 (quotations omitted). The 
court explained held that "the unequal treatment accorded a husband and wife through the 
operation of Idaho Code Section 32-909 is arbitrary on its face and demonstrates no 
substantial relation to the object of con~munity prcpcriy legislation." Id. The court 
f~lrther explained that "Ida210 Code Section 32-909 creates an unconstitutional distillction 
in thc division of marital property upon divorce and therefore is a denial of the equal 
protection of the laws as guaranteed in tile fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of 
the United States." la'. 
Here, Idaho Code Section 11-204 results in unequal treatment for a husband and a 
wife as regards their individual earnings during marriage because it treats the earnings of 
the wife differently than the earnings of the husband. It exempts from garnishment a 
wife's compensation "due and owing" witho~at. exempting from garnishlent a husband's 
coinpensation "due and owing." This unequal treatment accorded between a husband and 
a wife through operation of Idaho Code Sectioil 32-909 is arbitrary on its face and 
denlollstrates no substantial relation to the object of cominunity property legislation. 
In fact, Idaho Code Section 1 1-204 is contrary to the current object of coininullity 
property law. When Idaho Code Scction 1 1-204 was c~~acted in 188 1, Idaho's 
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community property law was that the husband had the exclusive right to nlanagc and 
control all the community property except for the earllings of the wife for her personal 
services. McMillan v. IJnitcd States Fire Ins. Co., 48 Idaho 163 (1 929). On the other 
hand, the wife had the exclusive right to manage and control her cominullity earniilgs 
resulting from her ow11 personal services. Id. If thc law were the sanle today, Idaho 
Code Sectioil 11-204 would bear a substantial relation to the object of colnmunity 
property law because execution against the husband should not extend to property over 
which he has no right to manage or control. However, in 1974, Idaho changed its 
community property law so that "[elither the husband or the wife shall have the right to 
manage and control the comlnunity property." See 1974 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 194, 3 2 
and Idaho Code Section 32-912. Thus, today the husband has the right to manage and 
control a wife's community earnings resulting from her own personal serviccs just as a 
wife has the right to manage and control a husband's coininunity earnings resulting from 
his own personal services. Given the change to the law in 1974, Idaho Code Section 1 1 - 
204 is actually contrary to curreilt Idaho community property law because it exempts 
from garnishment a husband's interest in property that he has cvery right to inanage and 
control. Accordingly, Idaho Code Section 1 1-204 creates an unconstitutional distinctioil 
in the treatment of marital property upon gar~iisl~ment and therefore is a denial of the 
equal protectioil of the laws as guaranteed in the fou~leentli alllendillellt of the 
Constitution of the United States. 
VI. CBEI CAN RECOVER ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL. 
With regard to a hearing on a nlotion to coiltest claim of exemption, Idaho Code 
Section 11-203(b) states that "the prevailing party at the hearing inay be awarded costs 
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pursuant to the Idaho rules of civil procedure." Idaho Dale of Civil Procedure 54(e)(5) 
states that "Lalttorney fees, when allowable by statute or contract, shall be deemed as 
costs in an action." Idaho Code Section 12-120(5) states that "[iln all instances where a 
party is entitled to reasonable attorney' fees and costs under subsection (1),(2), (3), or (4) 
of this section, such party shall also be entitled to reasonable postjudgmeilt attorney's 
fees and costs incurred in attempting to collcct on the judgment." 
Here, the Magistrate Court awarded attorney's fees in conllection with the 
judgment and therefore the law of this case is that attorney's fees are recoverable. 
Moreover, the con~plaint alleges compliance with Idaho Code Section 12- 120(3). The 
defelldailts adillitted these allegations as true having allowed judgment to be taken by 
default. Whereas this appeal is made in connection with CBEI's attempt to collect on the 
judginent within the l~leailillg of Idaho Code Section 12-120(5), CBEI requests that 
attorney's fees be awarded in favor of CREI and the defendants. 
VII. CONCLUSION. 
For all the reasons set forth above, CBEI respectfully requests that the court 
reverse the order of the Magistrate Court denying CBEI's motion to contest claim of 
exemption and that thc court a,wprd attorney's fccs on appeal against the defendants. 
DATED this / ?% of May, 2008. 
McGRATI-I, MEACHAM & SMITH, PLLC 
Attorneys for ~etitioiler, 
Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the / 4!zf May, 2008,I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF ON APPEAL to be served, by 
placing the same in a sealed eilvelope and depositing it in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, or by causii~g the sanle to be dclivered by hand, facsimile or overnight delivery, 
addressed to the following: 
[ .] U.S. Mail Marvin M. Smith 
[ Transmission Anderson Nelson Hall Smith, P.A. 
[ Hand Delivery 490 Memorial Drive 
[ ] Overnight Delivery Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
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ISB NO. 2236 
ANDERSON NELSON HALL SMITH, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drtve 
Post Office Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1 630 
Telephone (208) 522-3 00 1 
Fax (208) 523-7254 
Attorneys for Respondents 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, JN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
MAGISTK4TE DIVISION 
I 
CREDIT BUREAU OF EASTERN IDAHO, i Case NO. CV-06-130 
INC., an Idaho corporation, I 
I 
I RESPONDEKTS' B-F ON Appellant, 
I APPEAL 
V. I 
I 
JEFF D. LECHEMINANT and LISA I 1 
LECHEMINANT, I 
Respondents. I 
I 
COME NOW Respondents, by and through their attorney of record, and hereby submits 
their brief in opposition to the appeal of petitionerlappellant. 
ST;ITEMENT OF FACTS 
Credit Bureau of Eastan Idaho, Inc, obtained a judgment against Jeff Lecheminant and 
Lisa Lechemimnt while they were married Jeff and Lisa divorced and subsequently Jeff 
Lecheminant married Sandy Moulton, employed by E I W  Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho, 
Inc. is now attempting to garnish Sandy Moulton's wages to satisfy its judgment against Jeff 
Lecheminant, which w a  an antenuptlal debt. 
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ANALYSIS 
k ID-AH0 CODE 5 11-204 IS G VALID CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE TIUT HAS 
NEVER BEEN JXEPEALED. 
At the outset there is no doubt that wages earned by the parties during marriage are 
community property. This is clear in X.C. j 32-906(1), which states: 
All other property acquired after maniage by either husband or wife is community 
property. The income of all property separate or community, IS commumty 
property unless the conveyance by which it is acquired provides or both spouses, 
by written agreement specifically so providing: declare that all or specifically 
designated propwty and the income fiom all or the specifically designated property 
shall be the separate property of one of the spouses of the income from all or 
specifically designated separate property be the separate property of the spouse to 
whom the property belongs. Such property shall be subject to the management of 
the spouse owning the property and shall not be liable for the debts of the other 
member of the community. 
However, Idaho Code 5 11-204 states: 
All real and personal estate belonging to any married woman at the time of her 
nmiage, or to which she subsequently becomes entitled in her own right' and dl 
the rents, issues and profits thereof, and all compensation due or owing for her 
persona1 services, is exempt from execution against her husband. 
Said statute creates a special kind of community property. Professor of Latv W.J. Brokelbd 
noted in his 1962 book, The Commw.n.ity Properv Law of IdaJzo at pp.26-66: 
The Idaho legislature of 188 1 set up a special kind of community property, viz.: 
"rents, issues and profits" of the wife's separate property and "all compensation 
due or owing fox her personal services" (both of which are community property in 
Idaho) and provided that this special kind of community property should be 
"exempt fiom esecution against her husband." 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in Mchiillun v. United Stales Five In$. CO., 48 Idaho 1 63,270 
P.220 held: 
As to the earnings of a married w o r n ,  not living separate and apart from her 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
PAGE 82 
@. 1 1 .  2 0 0 8  1 1  : 5 6 A M  ANDFRSON N E L S O N  H A L L  S M I T H  1 
husband, on account o f  her persond senices, the exemption applies only to such 
earnings as are due and owing. After the earnings have been paid, or 
convexted into othex property, the exemption granted by said section no 
longer obtains. 
Id. at 280 P. 222 (emphasis added). 
In this case, the debts nlust be satisfied from the separate property of the debtor spouse 
(Jeff Leche~ninant) or from non-exempt community property. Otherwise, the j u d m n t  creditor 
obtains a windfall when a new community is formed. The separate property of the debtor spouse 
and non-exempt community property is still available to the Judgment creditor for satisfaction of 
the debt. Thus, certain property, like Ms. Moulton's wages, become shielded under the 
community property laws, under I.C. 8 1 1-204. 
B. X.C. Zj 32-912 DOES NOT ALLOW TI3E GARNISID!IENT JN THIS CASE. 
Plaintiff has asserted that pursuant to I.C. 5 32-9 12 the antenuptial debts of one spouse 
binds the community property and thus makes the community assets available for execution. This 
section states that "Either the husband or the wife shall have the nght to manage and control the 
community property and either may bind the comrnui~ity by contract . . ." The Plaintiffs 
argument i3 misplaced since the debt and judgment arose prior to the inception and existence of 
this community (with Ms. Moulton). The debts at issue in this case were not incurred during the 
existence of this community. The non-debtor spouse (Sandy Moulton) was not a party to the 
collection action against her husband and yet the Plaintiff has attempted to execute on the non- 
party, non-debtor's spouse's interest in the present community property in violation of her due 
process nghts. 
C, TNE DEBT WAS NOT INCURRED FOR THE BENEFIT OF "THIS'' 
COMMUNITY. , 
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Since the Plaintiff in this case attempted to garnish Ms. Moulton's wages, \vhich are 
exempt community per X.C. 4 11-204, the question then becomes whether or not a jud-anent 
creditor can attach the exempt community property of Ms. Moulron to satisfy the antenuptial debt 
of Ms. Moulton's present husband where she was neither a p&y nor judgment debtor. The 
courts have held that if the debt vas incurxed for the benefit of the community then the debt can 
be paid fiom the conxnunity property. The debt which gave rise to this action arose before this 
community was formed and was not incurred for the benefit of this cornunity of Ms. Modton. 
The community, therefore, is not obligated to repay such debts f?om this particular community 
propaty (wages), which is the exempt community property of Ms. Moulton under I.C. $ 1 1-204. 
The United States Ninth Circuit Cowt of Appeals (applyulg ?dAo law) in a matter 
regarding a foreclosure action stated, "Only if the debt is incurred for the benefit of the 
cornunity does I.C. § 32-9 12 allow satisfiction of the unpaid debt from the co~~rmni ty  
propelty." Filst Idaho Corporation v. Davis, 867 F,2d 1241, 1243 (9d' Cir. 1989). In Freeburn 
1;. Freebum, 97 Idaho 845, 849, 555 P.2d 385,389 (1976) the Court held "The character of an 
item of property as c o n h t y  or separate vests at the time of its acquisition." (Citations 
omitted). This is t l ~ e  logic that must be followed here, that the debt acquired 'by Mr. Lecheminant 
is separate in character since it was \rested prior to the formation of the new co&ty; or the 
debt is a community debt of a former community but cannot be satisfied out of t l~e  "resent7' 
specd kind of community property created by I.C. $ 11-204. 
D. THE PRII\'CIIIPLE OF EXTENSION PROTECTS THE \VAGES OF S&\DY 
RIOULTON. 
Upon reviewing Idal1o case law, none have addressed the specific question as to whether 
or not the special kind of community property created by X.C. fj I. 1-204, includ~ng wages, can be 
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attached by a judbment creditor to satis@ an antenuptial debt of the debtor spouse. However, 
there is case law indicating that community property classified under L C  8 1 1-204 caanot be used 
for that purpose. The subject debt was not incurred for the benefit of this present co-ty, the 
debt was not acquired during the existence of this cornmuniq, and its very nature is separate in. 
character in regard to the present community. 
Further, "[a] party chaI1,enging a statute on constitutional grounds bears the burden of 
proving &the statute is unconstitutional and must or7ercome a strong presumption of ~didity,." In 
re Ihrel, 144 Idaho 379, 162 P.3d 755, 762 (2007). 
ldaho Code 5 11-204 (in existence since 1881) has never been overturned by h e  ldaho 
Legislature and Idaho Supreme CourVCourt of Appeal, respectively. By symmetry of rea? oning it 
must be assumed that I.C. 5 1 1-204 applies equally to man-ied men as it does married wornan. 
This plinciple of extension has been approved in Idaho lav. See e .g ,  Nmeau v. Neveau, 103 
Idaho 707, 652 P.2d 655 (Ct. App. 1982); Harrideld v. District Court, 95 Idaho 540, 51 1 P.2d 
822 ( I  973). The exemption provided by 1.C. § 11 -204 is to be construed liberally in favor of the 
debtor. See e.g., In Re Moore, 269 BR 864 (Blutcy D. Idaho 2001). Therefore, in this case the 
exemption should be construed even more liberally for Ms. Moulton because she is not the debtor, 
not a party to this suit, and was not even married to Jeff Lecheminant vhen the debt was incurred. 
It is impo~tant o note that fi-om 19 15 to 1974, by statute, a wife had the exclusive 
management and control ofher earnings, not her husband. Therefore, since 1974 the wife kas 
actually had less control ofher earnings not more. If Plainliff's argument is accepted md Ms. 
Moulton is not granted the exemption given to hex- per I, C. 11-204, a married woman will 
effectively have no control over her earnings. 
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In this case, the wages Sandy Moulton receives horn EIRMC is compensation due or 
owing for her personal services Therefore, per I.C. 8 11-204 Sandy Moulton's wages are 
exempt from execution against her husband. 
E. SANDY MOULTON'S WAGES ARE NOT SUBJ3ECT TO GA4RNISHhlENT PER 
THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING IN MILLER V. MILLER, 113 
IDAHO 415 (1987). 
In Milley v. Miller, 113 Idaho 415,420,745 P.2d 294,299 (1987) the Idaho Supreme 
Court: stated and held: 
After the entry of the district court's judgment for damages against E. Paul, Pete 
filed pursuant to I. C. $ 8-509 (Supp. 1987) a motion for continuing garnishment 
against the wages of E. Paul's spouse, Paula Miller. Following a hearing, the co rn  
denied the motion on the ground of Pete's failure to name Paula as a party 
defendant. The district court reasoned that allowing a ganishment of Paula's 
wages without having been made a party defendant, and with the judgment having 
been entered only against her husband, would deny her due process of law. 
We agree with the district court's conclusion that the joinder of a spouse as a party 
defendant was a necessary prerequisite, under I.C. 9 8-509(b) . . . 
The language of I.C. 8-509 is spechcally limited to a "judgment creditor" and a 
'Yudgment debtor." "A well-settled rule of construction is that the words of a 
statute must be given their plain, usual and o r b a r y  meaning in the absence of my 
ambiguity." (Citations omitted). A judgment debtor according to Black's Law 
Diciiolzary (5dl ed. 2 979), p. 758 is, "A person against whom judgment has been 
recovered, and which remains unsatisfied." Paula, having not been a named party 
defendant: clearly did not clualify as a judgment debtor and, hence, was not within 
the scope of I.C. $ 8-509(b). 
The Millev case is closely analogous to the matter az hand. In this case, Sandy Moulton 
was not a party defendant and is not a "judgment debtor" just as Pauh Miller in the iMiller case, 
If the Idaho Supreme Court would not allow a contin~~ing garnishment against someone tvho IS 
not a '5udgrnent debtoi-" then. why would it allow any gamijlhment against someone who is not a 
'Ijudgrnent debtor"? Thus, it is E I ~ l C 3 s  position that Adille?* stands for the proposition that 
garnishment of any type can only be effected against persons who are actua1l.y party defendants in 
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a suit and are judgmeni: debtors. Therefore, because Sandy MouIton was not a party defendant in 
this matter and no judgment was entered against her, the wages of Sandy Moulton can not be 
garnished. 
F. TI.IE CASE OF ACTION COLLECTION SERVICES, JBC., IS NOT 
CONTROLLING IN THE JNSTANT CASE, 
The case ofAction Collection Smvices- Inc. v. Seele: 138 Idaho 753, 69 P.3d 173 (Ct. 
App. 2003) does not aid the c o u t  in its determination of the instant appeal. 
There are multiple factual and legal differences between h e  case at the bar and the Action 
Collection Ser~lces, Inc. case. Most o f  these issues have been addressed in previous sections; 
however, to recapitulate those differencesi the court should consider the following; 
1.  In Action Collection Services, Inc., Seele was the judgment debtor. 
2. Seele did not dispute that she was contractually liable for the debts encompassed 
by the Action judgment. 
3. There is absolutely no discussion in the Action Collection Senices, Inc. case of the 
exemption granted by I.C. 8 I 1-204. 
4. In the instant case, Sandy Moult on is not the judgment debtor. 
5. Sandy Moulton is not liable for the underlying debts that encompass the jud-ment 
in the instant case. 
What the appellant wishes to do is simply state that conmunity property is subject to 
garnishment and end the present discuss~on. This is not true in all cases under all circumstances 
The Miller case cited abo~re indicates that the mechanism of obtaining garnishment is limited to 
judgment creditors and judgment debtors. Sandy Moulton does not fit into l&e category of a 
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judgment debtor, in deed, Sandy Moulton is in thelsituation of the judgment debtor's new 
husband who was not named h the Action Collection Services, Inc, case. There is a reason for 
that: ganishent  would not work in regard to an individual not responsible fox the underlying 
debt and not named as a party Gudgernent debtor) in t he  judgment. 
In s-y, the Action Collection Services, Inc, case only serves to show the complete 
disconnect in the instant care between a judgment creditor and a party who is not responsible for 
the debt and is not susceptible to garnishment in as much as the indi~idual is not a judgment 
debtor. 
Based upon the analysis, case law precedent, and statute set forth above, respondents 
respectfully requests that this Court deny appellht's appeal in all respects 
DATED this _jd rt"  of qjbwLt _zooz .  
ANDERSON NELSON HALL SMITH, P.A. 
Attorney for Respondents 
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reby certi that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this !$?dayof ,2008, by hand delivery, mailing with the necessary postage 
affixed thereto, facsimile, or overnight mail. 
Bryan D. Smith 
MCGRATH, SMITH 
3 1 4 Shoup Avenue 
P.O. Box 5073 1 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-073 I 
[ ] Mailing 
[ ] Ove~night 
TVl-ARVN M. SMITH 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
Idaho State Bar # 441 1 
MCGRATH, SMITH & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Avenue 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
(208) 524-073 1 
1 I - -  MADIS0;f COUNTY 1 
Attorileys for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
JEFF D. LECHEMINANT and LISA 
LECHEMIANT, husband and wife 
CREDIT BUREAU OF EASTERN IDAHO, 
INC., AN IDAHO CORPORATION, 
Appellant, 
VS. 
Respondents. I 
Case No. CV-06-130 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF ON 
APPEAL 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
This matter comes before the court on appeal from the magistrate's order dated February 
20,2008 denying the motion filed by Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho, Inc. ("CBEI") to contest 
the claim of exemption filed by Sandy Moultoil (Moulton) and Eastern Idaho Regional Medical 
Center ("EIRMC.") 
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11. IDAHO CODE 6 11 -204 IS AN ANTIQUATED UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE. 
Idaho Code 3 1 1-204 denies equal protectioil of the laws guaranteed in the fourteenth 
amendment of the Constitution of the United States. A statute that provides for different 
classifications for husband and wife solely on the basis of sex is unenforceable if there is no 
reasonable basis for the different classifications that are related to the object of the legislation. 
Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho 461 (1976). CBEI has shown that there is no reasonable basis related to 
the object of Idaho Code 5 1 1-204's different classification for compensation of a wife for 
personal services as opposed to con~pensation of a husband for his persolla1 services. 
Importantly, respondents do not atteinpt to show (as in make absolutely no argument for) any 
reasoilable basis for Idaho Code 3 11-204's different classification for compensation of a wife 
for her personal services as opposed to coillpeilsation of a husband for his personal services. 
Accordingly, Idaho Code 3 1 1-204 is unconstit~~tional for all the reasons set forth in CBEI's 
opening brief. 
As a way of arguing that Idaho Code 3 1 1-204 is constitutional, respoildents claim that the 
judgment must be satisfied from the separate property of the judgment debtor spouse or from 
nonexempt community property, or "the judgment creditor obtains a windfall when a new 
community is formed."' However, it is the judgment debtor and the judgment debtor's wife who 
gain a windfall when a new coinmuility is formed if their coinin~~nity property becomes exempt 
from collectioil simply on the basis of sex classification. And it is in fact Idaho Code 3 12-204 
that provides this unconstit~~tional gratuitous windfall for the judgment debtor and his wife 
because Idaho Code 3 12-204 would not apply if CBEI were seclting to garnish the wages of a 
inan instead of a wornail. 
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111. IDAI-I0 CODE 6 32-91 2 DOES PERMIT GARNISHMENT OF THE COMMUNITY 
WAGES IN THIS CASE. 
Respondents contend that CBEI's reliancc on Idaho Code $ 32-912 is misplaced because 
the debt and judgment arose before the forination of the current community. However, CBEI 
cites Idaho Code 5 32-912 to establish that both husband and wife have the right to manage and 
coiltrol community property and that the wages of either spouse are community property that 
either has the right to manage and control. Importantly, respondents have conceded that "wages 
carned by the parties during marriage me community property."2 In response, respondents claim 
that the debts which are the subject of the current judgment are not subject to garnishment 
because they were incurred before the existence of the current conlmunity. But this argument 
has no legal basis, and respondents do not cite to any authority to support their position. 
To the contrary, a long line of Idaho cases have held that the separate antenuptial debts of 
either spouse are payable from community property. Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170 (1 995); 
Gz~stin v. Bynnz, 41 Idaho 538 (1 925); and Holl v. Empey, 32 Idaho 106 (1 919). Respondents 
have not even attempted to distinguish this Idaho case law and instead have chose11 to ignore it 
completely. Further pertinent Idaho case law includes Action Collection Service, Inc. v. Seele, 
138 Idaho 753 (Ct. App. 2003) in which the court allowed the garnishment of community wages 
of a judgment dcbtor to satisfy that judgment debtor's separate antenuptial debt. Here, CBEI 
asks for the same remedy to the extent CBEI seeks to garnish community wages to satisfy 
Lechemiant's separate antenuptial debt. 
Respondents argue that allowiilg such a garnishment is essentially unfair and in violation 
of the iloilparty/nondebtor spouse's due process rights. However, Moulton has had the 
opportunity to object to the garnishment as this appeal demonstrates. Therefore, she has not had 
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her due process rights violated. Also, Idaho courts recognize that "parties often marry with 
separate antenuptial debts" and further recognize that "those debts are payable from community 
property." Action Collection Service, Inc. v. Seele, supra, 138 Idaho at 758 and Bliss v. Bliss, 
supra, 127 Idaho at 173. Given that parties often marry with separate antenuptial debts, spouses 
who wish to avoid having their community wages garnished to satisfy separate antenuptial debts 
of their new spouse can readily enter into a prenuptial agreement in which the parties agree that 
each spouse's wages shall remain separate property rather than become community property. 
However, here, Moulton and Lechemiant did not avail themselves of any prenuptial agreement. 
IV. NO REQUIREMENT EXISTS THAT A DEBT MUST BENEFIT THE COMMUNITY 
BEFORE IT CAN BE SATISFIED OUT OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY. 
Respondents rely on First Idaho Corporation to argue that a debt must benefit the 
comn~unity before it can be satisfied out of coinmunity property. However, First Idaho 
Coryoration is readily distinguishable from this case. In First Idaho Coryoration, the debt at 
issue was a separate debt in the form of a mortgage note signed by the wife's deceased husband. 
When the husband defaulted, the bank sued the husband and the wife, who had not signed on the 
mortgage note. Importantly, the bank named the wife as a party and sought a judgment 
personally against her. However, the court dismissed the claim against thc wife because she had 
not signed on the note and therefore had no personal liability. The court also dismissed the claiin 
because the complaint seeking to hold the wife individually liable on a judgment did not allege 
that the debt was inc~rred for the benefit of the community. 
Here, CBEI has not sued Moulton and does not seek a judgillent against her. This fact 
maltes the case of First Idaho Corporation readily distinguishable. If CBEI were to seek a 
judgment against Moulton, CBEI would be required to show that she has personal liability for 
the debt by either (1) showing that she agrced to pay the debt; or (2) showing that the dcbt was 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL 
PAGE 93 'Wleadings\OO 14 Plaintiffs appellate reply bl.ief.doc 
incurred for the benefit of the community. Rathcr than seck a judgment against Moulton, CBEI 
is siinply seelting to satisfy Lecheminant's separate debt out of community property that exists in 
the form of Moulton's comlnunity wages. Stated differently, thc court in First Idaho 
Corporation would have had a different holding if the bank had obtained a judginent against the 
husband only and then sought satisfaction of the judgment out of community property held by 
the wife. Instead, the bank sougl~t a personal judgment against the wife even though she was not 
personally obligated for the debt that was not incurred for any colnlnunity benefit. 
Obviously, If'irst Idaho Corporation does not stand for the proposition that a debt can be 
satisfied from comnlunity property only when the debt is incurred for the benefit of the 
community. Otherwise, First Idaho C,'oryor-atiorz would be contrary to Gustin v. Byam, 4 1 Idaho 
at 538 and Holt v. Enzpey, 32 Idaho at 106 where the Idaho Supreme Court applied the rule that a 
spouse' separate anten~~ptial debt could be satisfied out of community property. Moreover, the 
Idaho Supreme Court cited the rule in Gustin and Holt with approval and again applied the rule 
(without regard to whether the debt was incurred for the benefit of the community) in Bliss v. 
Bliss, 127 Idaho at 170 in 1995--somc six years after First Idaho Corporation was decided. 
Finally, the Idaho Court of Appeals applied the rule that a spouse's separate antellulptial debt 
could be satisfied out of con~inullity wages (without regard to whether the debt was incurred for 
the bcnefit of the community) as recently as 2003 in Action Collection Service, Inc. v. Seele, 138 
Idaho at 753. Accordingly, respondents' reliailce on First Idaho Corporatiorz is misplaced. 
V. THE PRINCIPLE OF EXTENSION CANNOT BE APPLIED TO IDAHO CODE 4 11- 
204. 
As discussed more fi~lly in CBEl's opening brief, Idaho Code $1 1-204 unconstit~~tionally 
discrilnillates by providing a different treatment for individuals based upon sex. Respondents 
contend that the principle of "extension" should be applied to this statute malting Idaho Code $ 
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1 1-204 apply equally to married men and married women. While Idaho courts have approved 
the doctrine of ''extension," "extension" does not apply here. 
The cases respondents rely on deal with a statute that compellcd only a husband to pay 
child support and a differing age of majority for males (21 years old) and females (1 8 years old). 
Nevenu v. Neveau, 103 Idaho 707 (Ct. App. 1982) and IIarringfield v. District Court, 95 Idaho 
540 (1 973). The principle of extension was practical in these situations because the court could 
simply extend the statute to say that a wife too inust pay child support and that the age of 
majority for males is 18, not 2 1. But the application of the principle of extension is not a 
practical remedy for Idaho Code 3 1 1-204 because extending the statute to husbands would create 
as many problems as it would solve. 
The offending portion of Idaho Code 9 1 1-204 states that "all compensation due and 
owing [any married woi~lan] for her personal services, is exempt from execution against her 
husband." Idaho Code 3 11-204 also applies to all rents, issues, and profits from a wife's 
separate property. The pri~lciple of extension cannot be applied to Idaho Code 9; 1 1-204 because 
by doing so the statute would come into conflict with other Idaho law. For example, if extension 
is applied to Idaho Code 5 11-204, then all rents, issues and profits from either a husband or 
wife's separate property and all compensatioil due or owing for either the husband or wife's 
personal services would be exempt froin execulioil as against the separate debt of the spouse 
even though rents, issues and profits from separate property and wages incurred during marriage 
are coinmunity property under Idaho Code 9 32-906(1). Such an "extension" would also cut 
deeply into the holdings of Gustin, Holt, Bliss, and Action Collection Service, Inc., all of which 
hold that a spouse' antenuptial separate debt call be satisfied out of community property. 
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Moreover, Idaho Code 9 1 1-204 is premised on the antiquated notion that existed in 188 1 
when the husband had the exclusive right to manage and control all the community property 
cxcept for thc earnings of the wife for her personal services because a wife had the exclusive 
right to manage and control her earnings for her personal services. McMillan v. United States 
Fire Ins. (.lo., 48 Idaho 163 (1 929). However, in 1974 Idaho changed its community property 
law so that "[elither the husband or the wife shall have the right to manage and control the 
cornillunity property." 1974 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 194, 5 2 and Idaho Code 9 32-912. Thus, 
today the husband has the right to manage and control a wife's community earnings res~llting 
from her persolla1 services just as a wife has the right to manage and control a husband's 
community earnings resulting from his personal services. Therefore, the whole premise 
underlying Idaho Code 9 11 -204 no longer even exists. This court should not extcnd to men an 
antiquated law whose entire reason for existence no longer even applies to women. 
VI. MOULTON'S WAGES ARE SUBJECT TO EXECUTION BY GARNISHMENT 
BECAUSE THE SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING IN MILLER V. MILLER APPLIES 
ONLY TO A "CONTINUOUS" GARNISHMENT. 
Respondents' argument that under Miller garnishments of all types are not allowable 
upon the persons who are not a party to the judgment is incorrect. For a complete discussion 
regarding the application of Miller, CBEI refers the court to its opening brief on appeal. It is 
enough to state here that Miller is limited in its application to those cases involving an order of 
"continuous" garnishment and does not even address the issue of whether a judgment creditor 
can garnish the community wages of the judgment debtor's spouse by some vehicle other than a 
"continuous garnishment." 
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VII. THE WELL ESTABLISHED RUIE THAT SEPARATE ANTENUPTIAL DEBTS CAN 
BE SATISFIED OUT OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY CONTROLS THIS CASE. 
The reasoning of Action Collection Service, Inc. v. Seek, 138 Ida110 753 (Ct. App. 2003) 
and its progeny is valid and applies here. In Aclion Collection, it was the spouse with the 
separate antenuptial debt whose community wages were being garnislled. The court allowed the 
garnishment because the wages being garnished wcre clearly community property. Although 
Moulton is not the judgment debtor in this case, her wages are clearly community property just 
like those wages at issue in Action Collection Service, lnc. It is of no consequence who provides 
the "community wages" that become community property because Idaho community property 
law has never treated cotnrnunity property differently depending on whose effort produces the 
community property unless the parties have entered into a preiluptial agreement altering the 
nature or classification of wages earned d ~ ~ r i n g  marriage. Accordingly, this court should apply 
the rule that community property can be used to satisfy a spouse' separate antenuptial debt. 
VIII. CONCLUSION. 
For all the reasons set forth above, CBEI respectfully requests that the court rcverse the 
order of the Magistrate Court denying CBEI's motion to contest claim of exemption and that the 
court award attorney's fees on appeal against respondents. 
DATED this F ~ o f  July, 2008. 
Attorneys for petitioner, 
Credit Bureau of Eastern Ida110 
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the same in a sealed envelope and depositing it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or by 
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following: 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL D T S T I 4 ! K Y m O m W H L  i - 
, 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR MADISON COUNTY 
CREDIT BUREAU OF EASTERN 1 
IDAHO, and Idaho corporations, 1 
Petitioner, 1 Case No. CV-06- 130 
VS. 1 
1 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1 
JEFF D. LECHEMINANT and LISA 1 
LECHEMINANT, ) 
1 
Respondents. 1 
I. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
Back in March 2006, Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho ("CBBI") obtained a judgment 
against Jeff and Lisa Lecheminant for about $800. Jeff and Lisa divorced and Jeff married 
Sandy Moulton. Over the course of about a year and a half, CBEI has attempted to garnish 
Sandy's wages to pay her husband's $800 antenuptial debt. 
Sandy's employer, Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center ("EIRMC"), objected to 
CBEI's garnishment efforts and claimed ail exemption-specifically, Idaho Code Section 1 1- 
204. CBEI filed a motion contesting the exemption; Magistrate Judge Mark Rammell denied 
that motion in February 2008. CBEI appeals that decision. 
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11. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Under Idaho community property law, can the community wages of one spouse be used 
to satisfy the separate debt of the other spouse? 
2. If the community wages of one spouse can be used to satisfy the separate debt of the 
other spouse, are those wages subject to execution by garnishment? 
3. If the community wages of one spouse are subject to execution by garnishment, does 
Idaho Code $ 1 1-204 apply on a claim of exemption? 
4. Can CBEI recover attorney's fees on appeal? 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
CREI appeals the magistrate court's decision solely as a matter of law. This Court 
exerciscs free review. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
1. Sandy's wages are community property and subject to garnishment, unless exempt. 
I11 Idaho, the separate antenuptial debts of either spouse are payable from community 
property. ' Wages and salaries are community property.2 
Also in Idaho, there is no requirement that the garnishee be a judgment debtor. The 1987 
Idaho Supreme Court Miller v. Miller. was addressed by both attorneys in their  brief^.^ In Miller., 
the Court found that an Idaho statute, Section 8-509, required a collector to obtain a judgment 
before obtaining a continzling garnishment-by statute, there must be a judgment debtor before 
obtaining a continuing garnishment.4   here is no such requirement for a garnishment. CBEI 
seeks only a garnishment; Miller is inapplicable. 
So, Jeff s $800-ante1luptial debt is payable from Sandy's wages. The only way Sandy's 
wages call avoid garnishment is if her wages are "exempt by law."' 
I Action Collection Service, hlc, v. Seele, 13 8 Idaho 753, 758,69 P.3d 173, 178 (Ct. App. 2003). 
I.C. $ 32-906; Mnrtsch v. Martsch, 103 Idaho 142, 645 P.2d 882 (1982). 
' Miller v. Miller, 113 Idaho 415, 420, 745 P.2d 294,299 (1987). 
4 Miller v. Miller, 113 Idaho 415, 420, 745 P.2d 294, 299 (1987). 
' I.C. 6 1 1-201 ("All goods, chattels, moneys and other property . . . not exetnpt by law . . . are liable to 
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2. Even though Sandy's wages are community property, the wages are exempt from 
execution per Section 11-204. 
Sandy's wages are exempt from garnishment under Section 1 1-204: 
All real and personal estate belonging to any married woman at the time of her 
marriage, or to which she subsequently becomes entitled in her own right, and all 
the rents, issues and profits thereof, and all compensation due or owingfor her 
personal services, is exempt from execution against her h ~ o b a n d . ~  
This exemption from garnishment of earnings "applies only to such earnings as are due and 
owing. After the earnings have been paid, or converted into other property, the exemption 
granted by said section no longer  obtain^."^ 
Here, Sandy's wages are due and owing until she receives them; Sandy's wages are 
exempt until she receives them. CBEI cannot garnish her wages because garnishment takes the 
earnings before the employee receives them-the wages are still "due and owing." Section 11- 
204 provides an exemption for Sandy's wages from garnishment. 
CBEI argues that the Court should not apply Section 1 1-204 because, it argues, the 
section violates thc Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. In its support, CBEI cites 
the 1976 Idaho Supreme Court case Suter v. ~uter. '  In Suter, the Court found that an Idaho 
statute treated a husband unequally from his wife. Thc unequal treatment was arbitrary and 
lacked a substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so the Court found the statute 
unconstit~tional.~ CBEI seeks a similar interpretation of Section 1 1-204. 
But this case differs from Suter in an important way. In this case, unlike Sziter, the party 
arguing for an unconstitutional statutc fails to establish any violation of its constitutiollal rights. 
In Szlter, a husband argued that the Idaho statute as applied to him was unconstitutional. Here, 
CBEI claims that Section 11-204 unfairly limits its ability to collect an $800-antenuptial debt 
with equal zeal against bolh husbands and wives. According to CBEI, both men and women 
should be subject to its collection efforts, equally. CBEI has fiiled to establish that this is a right 
protected under the Equal Protection Clause. 
' (Emphasis added). 
7 McMillan v. U/?itedStates Fire Ins. Co., 48 Idaho 163, 280 P. 220 (1929). 
Szrter. v. Stcter, 97 Idaho 46 1, 546 P.2d 1 169 (1976). 
0 - - -.-- 
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Section 1 1-204 may be unconstitutional; it may violate the equal protection clause as to 
men. But that issue isn't before the Court. Before the Court is CBEI and Section 11-204 doesn't 
violate the Equal Protection Clause as to CBEI. 
3. Attorney fees on appeal are unwarranted. 
Because the Court affirms the magistrate court's decision, CBEI's petition for attorney 
fees on appeal is denied. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Sandy's EIRMC wages are exempt from garnishment per Section 1 1-204. The 
magistrate court's decision is affirmed. 
DATED this 9 day of February, 2009, 
u 
- 
. M/?,Disuiu -- Brent J. Moss - .  . - 
-- " 
. - 
/ 
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-,-,A 0.- District Judge , -,y,cj.r .$* \. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
s served upon the individuals listed below via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on 
this DecisionT day of February, 2009: 
Bryan D. Smith 
McGRATH, MEACHAM & SMITH, PLLC 
41 4 Shoup Avenue 
P.O. Box 5073 1 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Marvin M. Smith 
ANDERSON, NELSON, HALL, SMITH, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Attorney for Respondent 
Clerk of the Court 
By: 
4 
Deputy Clerk 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
Idaho State Bar No. 441 1 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
4 1 4 Shoup Avenue 
P. 0 .  Box 5073 1 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-073 1 
Telephone: (208) 524-073 1 
Telefax: (208) 529-4 166 
( MAR 1 2 .-. 74 
Attorneys for PlaintiffsIPlaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
CREDIT BUREAU OF EASTERN IDAHO , 1 
INC., an Idaho corporation, 1 
1 
PlaintiffIAppellant 1 
1 Case No. CV-06- 130 
VS. 1 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
JEFF D. LECHEMINANT and LISA 1 
LECHEMINANT, 1 
1 
DefendantsIRespondents. 1 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTIRESPONDENTS, JEFF D. 
LECHEMINANT AND LISA LECHEMINANT, AND THEIR ATTORNEY, 
MARVIN M. SMITH, ESQ., of the firm ANDERSON, NELSON, HALL, SMITH, 
P.A. 490 MEMORIAL DRIVE, IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83402, AND TO THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named plaintiff, Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho, Inc., appeals to the 
Idaho Supreme Court froin the District Court's Memorandum Decision dated February 9, 2009 
in which the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the 
County of Madison, Honorable Brent J. Moss, District Judge, presiding, affirmed the Magistrate 
Court's Order denying plaintiffs Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption dated February 20, 
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2. Plaintiff has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court from the pleadings 
described in paragraph one pursuant to Rule 1 1 (a), Idaho Appellate Rules. 
3. The issues which plaintiff intends to assert on appeal are the following: 
a. Does the Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho, Inc. have standing to assert that 
Idaho Code Section 1 1-204 is unconstitutional? 
b. Is Idaho Code Section 11 -204 unconstitutional because it exempts only the 
property of a married woman from execution and not the property of a married man? 
c. Is Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho, Inc. entitled to attorney fees under 
Idaho Code Section 12-120(5) where the attorney fees have been incurred in an attempt 
to collect on the judgment? 
4. There has been no order entered sealing any portion of the record in this case. 
5. Plaintiff requests that the reporter not prepare a transcript of the prior proceedings 
in this case. 
6. Plaintiff requests that the followiilg documents be included in the clerk's rccord in 
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules: 
a. Writ of Execution dated September 2 1, 2007; 
b. Claim of Exemption dated October 15, 2007; 
c. Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption dated October 16,2007; 
d. Brief in Suppoi-t of Motion to Contcst Claim of Exemption dated October 
16,2007; 
e. Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption 
dated October 19, 2007; 
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f. Order denying plaintiffs Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption dated 
February 20,2008; 
g. Notice of Appeal dated February 26,2008; 
h. Plaintiffs Brief on Appeal dated May 14, 2008; 
i. Respondent's Brief on Appeal dated June 1 1,2008; 
j. Plaintiffs Reply Brief on Appeal dated July 7, 2008; 
k. Memorandum Decision entered February 9, 2009 by the District Court 
sitting as an appellate court. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has not been served on the reporter 
because appellant requests the reporter not prepare a transcript of the prior proceedings in 
this case; 
(b) 'That the plaintiffs are exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee 
because the plaintiff requests that no transcript be prepared; 
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid; 
(d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid; 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20, Idaho App9late Rules. 
DATED this /&March, 2009. 
SMITI-I, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
By: 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE + I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of March, 2009,I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served, by placing the same in a sealed 
envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile 
transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
Marvin M. Smith, Esq. [ d ~ a i l  
ANDERSON, NELSON, HALL, [ ] Fax 
SMITH, P.A [ ] Overnight Delivery 
490 Memorial Drive [ ] Hand Delivery 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Marilyn R. Rasmussen [d .S.Mail 
Clcrk of the District Court 
4" 
[ I Fax 
134 East Main [ ] Overnight Delivery 
P. 0. Box 389 [ ] Hand Delivery 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
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IN THE DISrI'I<TC?' COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TH2 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
CREDIT BUREAU OF EASTERN IDAHO, ) 
INC., an Idaho Corporation 
PlaintiffIAppellant ) SUPREME COURT NO. 
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vs 1 CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF 
) APPEAL 
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1 
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2009, arztl Order Derzyirzg Plairztiff*~ Motion to Contest Clainz of Exenzption, dated February 
20,2008 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: Bryan D. Slfzitlr, PO Box 5073, Iclnho Falls, ID 83405- 
0 731 
ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: Marvin M. Smith, PO Box 51630, Idalto Falls, ID 
83405-1 630 
APPEALED BY: Credit B~lreau of Eastern I(la110, Inc., nlzcl I(lnlzo Corporation 
APPEALED AGAINST: Jeff D Leclzenzinrint crrzrl Lisa Lecl~ernilzalzt 
NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED: Mnrclz 12,2009 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED:N/A 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL FILED:N/A 
AMENDED NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL FILED: N/A 
APPELLATE FEE PAID: Yes 
RESPONIIENT OR CROSS RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL 
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WAS DISTRICT COURT REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT REQUESTED?: No 
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Dated this 7t" day of April, 2009 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
TI-IE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR MADISON COUNTY 
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exhibits, offered or admitted and which have been lodged with the Supreme Court or retained as 
indicated: 
NO. DESCRIPTION 
NONE 
IN WITNESS WHERE$IF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
said Court this /G day of qrt/ ,2009. 
MARILYN R. RASMUSSEN 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
Deputy Clerk 
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foregoing Clerk's Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my 
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designated to be included under Rule 28, IAR, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of Cross 
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I, Gwen Cureton, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Madison, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by United States Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the 
Clerk's Record and any Reporter's Transcript to each of the parties or their Attorney of 
Record as follows: 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
Bryan D Smith 
PO Box 5073 1 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-073 1 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
Marvin M. Smith 
PO Box 5 1630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1 630 
IN WITNESS 
seal of the said Court this 
MARILYN R. RASMUSSEN 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
BY u
Deputy Clerk 
